Aytona v. Castillo

FACTS

A day before President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office on December 30, 1961, former President Carlos P. Garcia appointed 350 ad interim appointees. One of whom was Dominador Aytona, who was appointed as the Governor of the Central Bank. 

However, on December 31, 1961, Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date when he was proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, Andres Castillo was appointed by Macapagal as the Governor of the Central Bank.

Aytona was prevented from holding office at the Central Bank. Hence, a petition to disregard the Administrative Order No. 2 was filed in court. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels the midnight or last-minute appointment was valid?

RULING

Yes, Administrative Order No. 2 was valid. 

The administration of Garcia was no more than a caretaker administration after the proclamation of the election of the Macapagal on December 13, 1961. However, filling up of vacancies by Garcia in important positions, if few, with assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment may be permitted.

In this case, the issuance of 350 appointments in one night was regarded as an abuse of Presidential prerogative where the exercise of double care, which was required and expected of Garcia, was hard to believe. 

Therefore, there is no reason to disregard Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels midnight or last-minute appointments. 

Tobias v. Abalos

PRINCIPLES:

• The creation of a separate congressional district is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
• The present limit of 250 members in the HoR is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment.
• It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress (e.g. census) in the enactment of said laws.

FACTS: 

Petitioners as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC. Prior to the enactment, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. 

Petitioners argued that:

1. the law violated the “one subject-one bill” rule as it embraces 2 subjects: 1) conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC; and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into 2 separate districts. 
2. the division of the two districts resulted in the increase in the composition of the HoR contrary to Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution
3. the division was not made pursuant to any census. 

ISSUES:

I) WON RA 7675 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule.

II) WON RA 7675 violated the present limit of 250 members in the HOR

III) WON the absence of the census as a basis in enacting the law rendered RA 7675 unconstitutional.

RULING:

I.

No, RA 7675 did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

The SC held that the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. 

In this case, RA RA 7675 which is an act converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC necessarily includes and contemplates the subject regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. 

Therefore the law did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

II.

No, RA 7675 did not violate Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution.

Under the Constitution, the HoR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. 

Hence, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment such as RA 7675.

Therefore, RA 7675 did not violate the present limit of 250 members in the HoR. 

III.

No, absence of showing the census as a basis in the enactment of the law does not render RA 7675 unconstitutional.

The SC held that the law enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress in the enactment of said laws. 

Bengson III v. HRET

PRINCIPLE: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

FACTS: 

Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. 

On March 17, 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He rand and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. 

Bengson filed a Quo Warranto case with HRET claiming that Cruz is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article 6 [6] of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition. 

ISSUES 

I) WON Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING

I.

Yes, Cruz was reverted to its natural-born citizenship.

Under the law, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

In this case, Cruz was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by enlisting himself in the US Marine Corps. Hence, Cruz will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

Therefore, Cruz is considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 

DISCUSSION

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this  Constitution; 
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and 
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Two ways of acquiring citizenship: 1) by birth, and 2) by naturalization. 

Three ways of re-acquiring citizenship: 1) by naturalization; 2) by repatriation; and 3) by direct act of Congress.

Two kinds of citizens: 1) natural-born citizens, and 2) naturalized citizen.

• Natural-born citizens are Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
• Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition (governed by CA 473, as amended) and reacquisition (governed by CA 63). 

Repatriation is simply consists of taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. For example: If a naturalized Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino through repatriation or if a natural-born Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. 

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation (as in this case), Philippine Citizenship as an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office

FACTS: 

Juan G. Frivaldo was a former natural-born citizen who became a naturalized American citizen and then applied for repatriation on August 17, 1994 to reacquire his previous Filipino citizenship. He then run for Governor in the province of Sorsogon and obtained the highest number of votes during the May 1995 elections.

Raul S. Lee, the second placer in the canvass, sought for Frivaldo’s disqualification on the grounds that his repatriation was invalid, thus he was not a citizen nor a registered voter; that Frivaldo was barred from running after two disqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections, and that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition of Frivaldo nullifying his proclamation. 

ISSUES 

I) WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal so as to cure his lack of citizenship and to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold the Office of Governor.

II) WON the judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

III) WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. 

IV) WON the proclamation of Lee, the candidate the second highest number of votes, valid and legal.

V) WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions which prevented Frivaldo to assume the position, considering that they were not rendered within the 15-day period before the election.

RULING

I.

Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid.

Under PD 725, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of the Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Moreover, PD 725 is a remedial and curative law which seeks to cure the defect in the existing law causing the difficulty of natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Filipino citizenship. 

In this case, Frivaldo, garnered the highest number of votes in the May 1995 elections for the position of a Governor in Sorsogon.  He applied for a repatriation back in August 17, 1994 and took his oath of allegiance at 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. Hence, it he should have been proclaimed, not Lee, as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 PM on the said date since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship which is reckoned from the time of his filing. 

Therefore, Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid. 

As regards the arguments of Lee: 

a) That PD 725 or the Immigration Law was repealed through a Memorandum of Pres. Corazon Aquino - The SC ruled that laws are repealed only by subsequent laws. In this case, the Memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment but as an executive policy addressed by Pres. Aquino to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might make. In other words, it was left to the first Congress to deal the matter. Hence, PD 725, which Frivaldo sought to reacquire his citizenship, was not repealed. 

b) That the application of Frivaldo for repatriation was filed only on June 29, 1995 and was approved on June 30, 1995 - The SC ruled that the application for repatriation was filed with the OP in Malacañang on August 17, 1994. On June 29, 1995, he was asked to fill out and re-submit the form that the Committee required. Under repatriation, the applicant who was a former natural-born Filipino shall revert to such status.  Hence, Frivaldo who was a natural-born citizen shall revert to such status. 

c) That only Filipino citizens and registered voter can run and be elected to public office - As to citizenship, the SC ruled that although Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Citizenship can be reckoned from the date the official governs the people, the country, or a territory. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. In this case, Frivaldo reacquired his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the same day as the term for the Governor began. Hence, he is qualified in the citizenship requirement. As to being a registered voter, the SC ruled that Sec. 39 of the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of the qualification. In this case, Frivaldo is a registered voter of Sorsogon. 

II.

No, the judicially declared disqualifications of Frivaldo for lack of Filipino citizenship does not bar him to run for position.

The SC ruled that the previous disqualifications cannot govern a person’s status with finality as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship. Hence, the disqualifications against Frivaldo in the 1988 and 1992 elections cannot bar him to run again as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship.

III.

Yes, the COMELEC has the power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and disqualifications of all elective officials. 

Under the law, the power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following the proclamation.

In this case, the Frivaldo petition questioning Lee’s proclamation was filed only 6 days after the proclamation. Hence, COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the case. 

IV.

No, the proclamation of Lee, the candidate with the second highest number of votes, was not valid.

Under the law, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

In this case, Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Hence, he should be proclaimed and not Lee. 

V.

No, the COMELEC did not exceed in jurisdiction when it issued Resolutions disqualifying him for want of citizenship even if it were rendered beyond the 15-day period as prescribed under Section 78.

The SC ruled that the Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Citizenship shall reckon from the day the official begins to govern or to discharge his functions, that is, upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Quo warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

Santiago v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Initiative to the Constitution, Delegation of Power

FACTS:

Pursuant to Article XVII [2] of the 1987 Constitution , Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.” As required under the COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country to reach the Constitutional threshold on the number of signatures to be gathered based on the conduct of People’s Initiative. 

Senator Santiago, among others, filed a special action for prohibition on the said petition based on the following arguments:

1. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. 

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.

3. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not revision. 

ISSUE:

1. WON the Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition. 

The issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary

RULING:

I.

No, the provision is not self-executory. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 

RA 6735, which provides for the 3 systems of initiative, is incomplete as it failed to provide the details in implementing the initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Consequently, having failed to satisfy the requirements of subordinate legislation, the delegation of the power to COMELEC is invalid. Therefore, COMELEC has no power in promulgating rules in the implementation of the amendment through people’s initiative.

II.

No, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. More so that it is merely entered as undocketed.

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DISCUSSIONS:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

There are three (3) systems of initiative per RA 6735, namely:

1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution (lacking in RA 6735);

2. Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

The COMELEC rule is a delegation of legislative authority. It is valid only if the law:

1. is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (lacking in RA 6735);

2. fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (lacking in RA 6735);

General Rule:  What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Exception:

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

3. Delegation to the people at large;

4. Delegation to local governments; and

5. Delegation to administrative bodies (empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules is a form of delegation of legislative authority) 

The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are

1. to prescribe the form of the petition;

2. to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;

3. to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and

4. to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election