What are the grounds for changing the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC by a paty-list organization?

      TOPICS:

1. Grounds for changing the order of nominees in the party-list organization.
2. Requisites of a valid IRR  

Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), through its President, Joel Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of their nominees for the 2007 elections. 

As submitted before the COMELEC, CIBAC's nominees are in the following order: Villanueva, Lokin, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang. However, Villanueva sought that COMELEC confirm the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang, and approve the following new nominees in the following order: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, and Borje. 

The COMELEC approved the new nominees by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804. Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 recognizes the withdrawal of a nominee by the party as one of the exceptions in the general rule that no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC's Resolution No. 7804 approving CIBAC's petition for withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and others and its substitution of them with new nominees was valid. 

RULING: 

I. 

No, COMELEC Resolution No. 7804, which approves CIBAC's petition for withdrawal, nomination, and substitution, is not valid. 

The Supreme Court ruled that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.

In this case, Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 exclusively enumerates the three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated." However, Section 13 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it added "withdrawal by the party" as a ground for substituting a nominee in a party-list. 

Therefore, the inclusion of withdrawal by the party as among the exceptions exclusively enumerated under the law is invalid. Thus, approval of the petition of CIBAC to withdraw Lokin as one of its nominees is invalid. 

  

Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?

       TOPIC:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?
2. Other benefits (in the statute) vs. Other wage-related benefits (in the admin regulation)

Guagua National Colleges (GNC) vs. Guagua National Colleges (GNC) Faculty Labor Union and Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Unions 

FACTS:

Respondents Guagua National Colleges (GNC) Faculty Labor Union and Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Unions demanded GNC that the 70% of the tuition fee incremental proceeds (TIP) should be allocated to the payment of salaries or wages of the faculty and all other employees of the school under Section 182 (b) of the 2010 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools in Basic Education (2010 Revised Manual). 

Petitioner GNC argued that the school management has discretion on the allocation of the 70% of the TIP. Petitioner stressed that RA 6728 is controlling in the manner of the distribution. 

Under Section 5(2) of R.A. 6728, 70% of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel.

However, DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992 provides that the minimum of 70% incremental proceeds shall be added to the salaries/wages/allowances and other wage-related benefits. In effect, the guidelines issued under DECS Order No. 15, series of 1992 on the allocation of the 70% incremental proceeds under RA 6728 restricted the scope of "other benefits" by limiting its applicability to "wage-related benefits," which the law itself does not require. 

The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the respondent labor unions. The VA ruled that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law that they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to great weight and respect. In this case, the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) is the agency tasked to implement RA 6728. Thus, DECS Order No. 15, series of 1992 (Guidelines on the Allocation of the Minimum 70% and 20% Incremental Proceeds Required under RA No. 6728) and subsequently, the 2010 Revised Manual, should prevail. 

The term "other benefits," as used in Section 5 (2) of RA 6728, should be interpreted as "wage-related benefits" or one that is immediately available or may be availed of by the employee while he is still working with the employer. A retirement plan is not a "wage-related benefit," since a Retirement Plan provides benefits to employees upon retirement; it does not provide immediate benefit or relief that may be availed of while the employee is still working. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the VA. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term "other benefits" under RA 6728 should only refer to "wage-related benefits" under DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992. 

RULING: 

No. 

Jurisprudence provides that a law is controlling and cannot be amended by an administrative rule or regulation. Hence, in case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. 

In this case, RA 6728 does not qualify the term "other benefits," contrary to DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992, which limits the increase to "wage-related benefits" only. Thus, the allocation of a portion of the 70% TIP for the employees' retirement plan, which is clearly intended for the benefit of the employees, falls under the category of "other benefits" as provided under the law. 

Therefore, the increase in the retirement plan is permissible under RA 6728. 

  

Which should prevail when conflicts arise between an administrative regulation and a statute?

      TOPIC:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?
2. What does basic salary mean?

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. De la Serna

FACTS:

Petitioner Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. was allegedly found by the Department of Labor and Employment to have committed an underpayment of the 13th month pay given to its medical representative employees. 

DOLE cited Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of PD 851 or the 13th Month Pay Law, as promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines, the "commission shall be included in the computation of the 13th month pay".

Petitioner argued that the computation of the 13th month pay which is 1/12 of the basic salary should be based solely on the basic salary not including the commission and other benefits.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law should prevail over P.D. 851. 

RULING: 

No, the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law do not prevail over P.D. 851.

Under the rules on statutory construction, an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.

In this case, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly added the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851 when it included the commission as part of the basic salary for purposes of computation of the 13th month pay. 

Therefore, the computation for the 13th month pay as provided in the Revised Guidelines is not valid. 

  

What are the requisites for a valid classification under the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

     TOPICS:

1. Requisites of a valid classification; Classification also Applies to Future Conditions

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.”

Petitioner filed a case before the CFI of Leyte against Ormoc City, alleging that the ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: 

Yes, the ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 

Jurisprudence provides that the subject of legislation must be reasonable for it not to be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, such that it must be based on substantial distinctions; germane to the purpose of the law; the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; and that the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 

In this case, Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 imposes taxes only on centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The tax ordinance is exclusive to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and does not apply to other identical sugar central which may be established in the future. 

Therefore, the ordinance is violative of equal protection as it applies only to present conditions and does not apply to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present. 

  

What are the tests of a valid ordinance?

     TOPICS:

1. Tests of a valid ordinance
2. Formal requirements - enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU; passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
3. Substantive requirements - conform with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes - due process requirements (procedural - notice & hearing & substantive - lawful means and lawful purpose) & the 6 requisites 

Legaspi vs. City of Cebu

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 authorizing the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions. 

Petitioner Atty. Jaban had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, was impounded for 3 days, and that he was imposed with a fine of 4,200. Petitioner filed in the RTC of Cebu City seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional.

RULING: 

No, the ordinance is not unconstitutional. 

For an ordinance to be constitutional, it must comply with the formal requirements, such that it must be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government units, and it must comply with the substantive requirements, such that it must conform with the limitations under the Constitution.

In this case, Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the corporate powers of the local government units under Section 458 of the LGC, such as the power to regulate traffic on all streets and prohibit encroachments or obstacles. Moreover, Ordinance No. 1664 also conforms with the limitation on due process under the Constitution. While due process requires notice and hearing, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles without notice falls under its exceptions. Notice is not necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of the apprehension. 

Therefore, Ordinance No. 1664 is constitutional. 

  

What are the tests of a valid ordinance? What is the principle of Noscitur a Sociis?

    TOPICS:

1. What is the principle of noscitur a sociis? 
2. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an ordinance?
3. Tests of a valid ordinance

Magtajas vs. Pryce

FACTS:

In 1992, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) leased a portion of a building belonging to the Petitioner for the opening of its casino in Cagayan de Oro City. 

However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City subsequently issued Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the issuance of business permits and cancelling existing permits for the operation of a casino.

The Petitioner assailed the ordinances before the CA, which declared the ordinances invalid. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed ordinances are valid. 

RULING: 

No, the assailed ordinances are not valid. 

A valid ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. 

In this case, the prohibition on the operation of casino in Cagayan de Oro City under Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 contravenes P.D. 1869, a statute granting the PAGCOR to operate casinos. 

Therefore, the ordinances are not valid.   

General Law vs. Special Law: Which should prevail in case of conflict?

   TOPICS:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a special law and a general law? 
2. What should be the rule in construction in case of doubt in statutes conferring powers to administrative bodies?

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal

FACTS:

Petitioner Payawal entered into a contract to sell with Respondent Solid Homes, Inc. in 1975 over a subdivision lot in Marikina. Despite being fully paid in 1981, Respondent failed to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the Petitioner. 

Hence, the Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC Quezon City requesting the Respondent for the delivery of the title or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts they paid. The Respondent, in turn, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, it being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD 957, as amended by PD 1344.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioner and cited BP 129 as the basis of its jurisdiction. BP 129 is a later enactment, promulgated in 1981, as opposed to PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, as promulgated in 1978. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint involving refund or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer. 

RULING: 

No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint involving a refund or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer.

Under the rules of statutory construction, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.

In this case, PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, a special law, should prevail over B.P. 129, a general law.  Although BP 129 is a later general law governing the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, it did not repeal PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, an earlier special law granting the National Housing Authority jurisdiction over refunds or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer. Thus, the jurisdiction of the NHA should be construed as an exception to the general jurisdiction of the RTC.

Therefore, it is the NHA, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over refunds or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer.