Second Placer Rule vs. Rule of Succession; Three Classifications of Domicile; Requisites of Domicile by Choice

TOPICS:

1. Second Placer Rule has no legal basis, thus, the Rule on Succession shall govern when a permanent vacancy is created after the winning candidate is disqualified from the office to which he was elected. 
2. The three classifications of domicile are domicile of origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law. 
3. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; the intention to remain there for an indefinite period of time; and the intention to abandon the old domicile. The last two requisites were not complied with by Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu. 

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu vs. COMELEC, et al. 

FACTS:

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu was the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Abdullah Sangki (DAS), Magunidanao, after winning the May 2019 elections. While being a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, Pax Ali filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Provincial Governor of Sultan Kudarat on October 7, 2021. Subsequently, Pax Ali resigned as Mayor of DAS, Maguindanao on November 15, 2021, and won during the May 2022 elections. 

Pax Ali’s opponent, Sharifa Akeel Mangudadatu, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel his COC on the ground that he misrepresented in his COC that he had been residing in Sultan Kudarat for at least one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, when in fact he was still a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, being their municipal mayor. 

Pax Ali argued that his domicile of origin was at Sultan Kudarat. However, he temporarily transferred to DAS, Maguindanao, in compliance with his residency requirement for the position of Mayor. He further argued that despite this, he always had the inherent intention to return to his roots in Sultan Kudarat. 

Both the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc ruled that Pax Ali committed a material misrepresentation as regards his residence in Sultan Kudarat.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC when he ran for the position of Governor in Sultan Kudarat
2. If so, whether or not the second placer rule or the rule of succession will govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat.

RULING: 

I. 

Yes, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

The Local Government Code provides that a governor must be a resident of the province where he intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. 

In this case, Pax Ali stated in his COC that he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for 1 year and 8 months before the May 9, 2022 elections. However, it was only on November 15, 2021, when Pax Ali resigned as the Mayor of DAS. Counting from said date, he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for only 5 months and 22 days immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections. This shows that Pax Ali’s resignation as Mayor and acquisition of a new domicile in Sultan Kudarat were done too late.  

Therefore, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

II.

The rule of succession shall govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat. 

The Local Government Code provides that with respect to vacancies in the Office of the Governor, the Vice Governor shall become the Governor.  A permanent vacancy is created when the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected. 

Therefore, the above concern calls for the application of the rule on succession.

DISCUSSIONS:

Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. There are three classifications of domicile: 

1. Domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; 
2. Domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
1. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; an intention to remain there (not met by Pax Ali); and an intention to abandon the old domicile (not met by Pax Ali).
1. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
3. Domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person, independently of his residence or intention

Apart from Pax Ali's failure to effect a change of domicile from DAS Maguindanao to Sultan Kudarat, one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, Pax Ali’s intention to remain in Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao are missing. 

Pax Ali’s intention to maintain a residence in Sultan Kudarat and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao became manifest only when he resigned as Mayor of DAS on November 15, 2021 – a mere afterthought. Clinging to his position as Mayor in DAS Maguindanao when Pax Ali filed his COC as Governor in Sultan Kudarat earlier on October 7, 2021 meant that he must comply with the continuing requirement of remaining a resident of DAS, Maguindanao during his entire tenure. Jurisprudence dictates that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. These qualifications must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure. This renders questionable Pax Ali's bona fide intent to remain at Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period of time.

Moreover, since Pax Ali failed to show that he had established a new domicile at the time of the filing of his COC, his residency in DAS continues. He remained a resident of DAS, Maguindanao as of October 7, 2021.

The quantum of proof necessary to establish a change in domicile in election cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Full text here. 

ALLOCATION OF SEATS FOR PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES

The following are the steps to determine the winners under the party-list system in the Philippines. These steps have been updated based on the 1987 Constitution and the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 

Step 1: The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 

Step 2: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This is called the Guaranteed Seat. 

• Example: AKBAYAN garnered 2,750,864 votes, representing 6.71% of the total votes cast for the party-list system as of 12:00 AM of May 14, 2025. Having surpassed the 2% threshold, it is entitled to one guaranteed seat in Congress, to be occupied by its first nominee.

Step 3: Those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to Additional Seats in proportion to their total number of votes.

• To determine the additional seats, compute first for the maximum seats reserved under the party-lists, that is, Total No. of Legislative Districts / 0.80 x 0.20 = Maximum Seats
• Example: 254 legislative districts for the May 12, 2025 elections / 0.80 x 0.20 = 63 maximum seats reserved under the party-list system
• After determining the maximum seats, compute for the additional seats, that is, Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % x Remaining Seats (maximum seats – guaranteed seats) = Additional Seats
• Example: AKBAYAN garnered 2,750,864 votes or 6.71% of the Total Votes for Party List. Therefore, the computation should be 6.71% x (63 maximum seats - 6 guaranteed seats for party-lists who surpassed the 2% threshold as of 12:00 AM of May 14, 2025) = 3.8 additional seats

Step 4: Add the Guaranteed Seats and the whole integer of the Additional Seats. 

• Only the whole integer of the above product of the votes garnered over total votes for party list, in % and of the remaining seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats 
• Example: AKBAYAN's computed 3.8 additional seats entitle it to 3 more congressional representatives, in addition to its 1 guaranteed seat. This brings its total to 4 seats in the House of Representatives for the 20th Congress.
• Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed

Step 5: We apply the Three-Seat Cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

• Example: Although AKBAYAN is projected to earn a total of 4 seats based on the number of votes it received, it can only occupy a maximum of 3 seats in the House of Representatives due to the three-seat cap rule applied to all party-list groups.

For more details, refer to the formula and computations found here: Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives or you may refer to the spreadsheet format for application of the above rules. 

De Castro v. JBC

FACTS

To fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno on May 17, 2010, the JBC was ordered to conduct with the proceedings for the nomination of candidates; prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; and submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees.

As argued by the OSG, the incumbent President has the power to appoint the next CJ.

Sec. 15, Article VII or the prohibition of the President to appoint 2 months immediately before the election does not cover appointments in the judiciary. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments?

RULING

Yes, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments.

The prohibition against the President or Acting President in making appointments within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the members of the SC. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. VII to the appointment of the members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. 

In this case, the President may appoint any members of the Supreme Court within 2 months before the next presidential elections. It is the imperative duty of the President under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from the occurrence. 

Therefore, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments. 

Full text here

 

Aytona v. Castillo

FACTS

A day before President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office on December 30, 1961, former President Carlos P. Garcia appointed 350 ad interim appointees. One of whom was Dominador Aytona, who was appointed as the Governor of the Central Bank. 

However, on December 31, 1961, Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date when he was proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, Andres Castillo was appointed by Macapagal as the Governor of the Central Bank.

Aytona was prevented from holding office at the Central Bank. Hence, a petition to disregard the Administrative Order No. 2 was filed in court. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels the midnight or last-minute appointment was valid?

RULING

Yes, Administrative Order No. 2 was valid. 

The administration of Garcia was no more than a caretaker administration after the proclamation of the election of the Macapagal on December 13, 1961. However, filling up of vacancies by Garcia in important positions, if few, with assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment may be permitted.

In this case, the issuance of 350 appointments in one night was regarded as an abuse of Presidential prerogative where the exercise of double care, which was required and expected of Garcia, was hard to believe. 

Therefore, there is no reason to disregard Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels midnight or last-minute appointments. 

Tobias v. Abalos

PRINCIPLES:

• The creation of a separate congressional district is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
• The present limit of 250 members in the HoR is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment.
• It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress (e.g. census) in the enactment of said laws.

FACTS: 

Petitioners as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC. Prior to the enactment, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. 

Petitioners argued that:

1. the law violated the “one subject-one bill” rule as it embraces 2 subjects: 1) conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC; and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into 2 separate districts. 
2. the division of the two districts resulted in the increase in the composition of the HoR contrary to Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution
3. the division was not made pursuant to any census. 

ISSUES:

I) WON RA 7675 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule.

II) WON RA 7675 violated the present limit of 250 members in the HOR

III) WON the absence of the census as a basis in enacting the law rendered RA 7675 unconstitutional.

RULING:

I.

No, RA 7675 did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

The SC held that the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. 

In this case, RA RA 7675 which is an act converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC necessarily includes and contemplates the subject regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. 

Therefore the law did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

II.

No, RA 7675 did not violate Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution.

Under the Constitution, the HoR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. 

Hence, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment such as RA 7675.

Therefore, RA 7675 did not violate the present limit of 250 members in the HoR. 

III.

No, absence of showing the census as a basis in the enactment of the law does not render RA 7675 unconstitutional.

The SC held that the law enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress in the enactment of said laws. 

Bengson III v. HRET

PRINCIPLE: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

FACTS: 

Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. 

On March 17, 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He rand and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. 

Bengson filed a Quo Warranto case with HRET claiming that Cruz is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article 6 [6] of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition. 

ISSUES 

I) WON Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING

I.

Yes, Cruz was reverted to its natural-born citizenship.

Under the law, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

In this case, Cruz was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by enlisting himself in the US Marine Corps. Hence, Cruz will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

Therefore, Cruz is considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 

DISCUSSION

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this  Constitution; 
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and 
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Two ways of acquiring citizenship: 1) by birth, and 2) by naturalization. 

Three ways of re-acquiring citizenship: 1) by naturalization; 2) by repatriation; and 3) by direct act of Congress.

Two kinds of citizens: 1) natural-born citizens, and 2) naturalized citizen.

• Natural-born citizens are Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
• Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition (governed by CA 473, as amended) and reacquisition (governed by CA 63). 

Repatriation is simply consists of taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. For example: If a naturalized Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino through repatriation or if a natural-born Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. 

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation (as in this case), Philippine Citizenship as an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office

FACTS: 

Juan G. Frivaldo was a former natural-born citizen who became a naturalized American citizen and then applied for repatriation on August 17, 1994 to reacquire his previous Filipino citizenship. He then run for Governor in the province of Sorsogon and obtained the highest number of votes during the May 1995 elections.

Raul S. Lee, the second placer in the canvass, sought for Frivaldo’s disqualification on the grounds that his repatriation was invalid, thus he was not a citizen nor a registered voter; that Frivaldo was barred from running after two disqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections, and that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition of Frivaldo nullifying his proclamation. 

ISSUES 

I) WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal so as to cure his lack of citizenship and to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold the Office of Governor.

II) WON the judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

III) WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. 

IV) WON the proclamation of Lee, the candidate the second highest number of votes, valid and legal.

V) WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions which prevented Frivaldo to assume the position, considering that they were not rendered within the 15-day period before the election.

RULING

I.

Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid.

Under PD 725, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of the Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Moreover, PD 725 is a remedial and curative law which seeks to cure the defect in the existing law causing the difficulty of natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Filipino citizenship. 

In this case, Frivaldo, garnered the highest number of votes in the May 1995 elections for the position of a Governor in Sorsogon.  He applied for a repatriation back in August 17, 1994 and took his oath of allegiance at 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. Hence, it he should have been proclaimed, not Lee, as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 PM on the said date since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship which is reckoned from the time of his filing. 

Therefore, Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid. 

As regards the arguments of Lee: 

a) That PD 725 or the Immigration Law was repealed through a Memorandum of Pres. Corazon Aquino - The SC ruled that laws are repealed only by subsequent laws. In this case, the Memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment but as an executive policy addressed by Pres. Aquino to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might make. In other words, it was left to the first Congress to deal the matter. Hence, PD 725, which Frivaldo sought to reacquire his citizenship, was not repealed. 

b) That the application of Frivaldo for repatriation was filed only on June 29, 1995 and was approved on June 30, 1995 - The SC ruled that the application for repatriation was filed with the OP in Malacañang on August 17, 1994. On June 29, 1995, he was asked to fill out and re-submit the form that the Committee required. Under repatriation, the applicant who was a former natural-born Filipino shall revert to such status.  Hence, Frivaldo who was a natural-born citizen shall revert to such status. 

c) That only Filipino citizens and registered voter can run and be elected to public office - As to citizenship, the SC ruled that although Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Citizenship can be reckoned from the date the official governs the people, the country, or a territory. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. In this case, Frivaldo reacquired his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the same day as the term for the Governor began. Hence, he is qualified in the citizenship requirement. As to being a registered voter, the SC ruled that Sec. 39 of the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of the qualification. In this case, Frivaldo is a registered voter of Sorsogon. 

II.

No, the judicially declared disqualifications of Frivaldo for lack of Filipino citizenship does not bar him to run for position.

The SC ruled that the previous disqualifications cannot govern a person’s status with finality as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship. Hence, the disqualifications against Frivaldo in the 1988 and 1992 elections cannot bar him to run again as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship.

III.

Yes, the COMELEC has the power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and disqualifications of all elective officials. 

Under the law, the power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following the proclamation.

In this case, the Frivaldo petition questioning Lee’s proclamation was filed only 6 days after the proclamation. Hence, COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the case. 

IV.

No, the proclamation of Lee, the candidate with the second highest number of votes, was not valid.

Under the law, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

In this case, Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Hence, he should be proclaimed and not Lee. 

V.

No, the COMELEC did not exceed in jurisdiction when it issued Resolutions disqualifying him for want of citizenship even if it were rendered beyond the 15-day period as prescribed under Section 78.

The SC ruled that the Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Citizenship shall reckon from the day the official begins to govern or to discharge his functions, that is, upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Quo warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

Santiago v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Initiative to the Constitution, Delegation of Power

FACTS:

Pursuant to Article XVII [2] of the 1987 Constitution , Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.” As required under the COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country to reach the Constitutional threshold on the number of signatures to be gathered based on the conduct of People’s Initiative. 

Senator Santiago, among others, filed a special action for prohibition on the said petition based on the following arguments:

1. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. 

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.

3. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not revision. 

ISSUE:

1. WON the Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition. 

The issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary

RULING:

I.

No, the provision is not self-executory. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 

RA 6735, which provides for the 3 systems of initiative, is incomplete as it failed to provide the details in implementing the initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Consequently, having failed to satisfy the requirements of subordinate legislation, the delegation of the power to COMELEC is invalid. Therefore, COMELEC has no power in promulgating rules in the implementation of the amendment through people’s initiative.

II.

No, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. More so that it is merely entered as undocketed.

-----------------------------------

DISCUSSIONS:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

There are three (3) systems of initiative per RA 6735, namely:

1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution (lacking in RA 6735);

2. Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

The COMELEC rule is a delegation of legislative authority. It is valid only if the law:

1. is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (lacking in RA 6735);

2. fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (lacking in RA 6735);

General Rule:  What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Exception:

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

3. Delegation to the people at large;

4. Delegation to local governments; and

5. Delegation to administrative bodies (empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules is a form of delegation of legislative authority) 

The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are

1. to prescribe the form of the petition;

2. to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;

3. to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and

4. to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election

Daza v. Singson

TOPICS: Political Question and Justiciable Question; Proportional representation from the political parties to the Commission on Appointments 

FACTS:

Petitioner Daza was a representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments. When the 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the members of LDP increased to 159, while the Liberal Party was left with 17 members. 

In effect, the HoR revised its representation in the Commission on Appointment by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and gave it to Luis Singson from the newly-formed LDP. 

Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the 12 members of the HoR in the Commission on Appointment shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties. 

Daza argued that the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission on Appointment is not based on a permanent political realignment as the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. 

Singson also argued that the question raised was political in nature, that is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Further, Singson argued that the transfer of the 24 members to the LDP was permanent. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the issue is a political question.

II. WON the Constitution contemplates that the members from the Commission on Appointments should come from a political party that has “aged” enough

III. WON the HoR can change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. 

RULING:

I.

No, the issue involves a justiciable question.  

Under the law, a justiciable question is one that involves the legality and not the wisdom of an act complained of. 

In this case, the question involves the manner of filling the Commission on Appointment as prescribed by the Constitution. Assuming arguendo that it was a political question, it is still within the power of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case. 

II.

No. The requirement that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.

The Liberal Party, a faction from the Nacionalista Party, was created in 1945 to support Manuel Roxas’s bid for the Presidency. It was 4 months old then but no question was raised as to its representation in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunal. It was the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

In this case, the LDP has been in existence for more than 1 year. 

Therefore, the Constitution does not contemplate that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence as basis for its representation in the Commission on Appointment. 

III.

Yes, the HoR has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.

It is understood that such changes must be [1] permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or [2] formal disaffiliation and [3] permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. 

The Court would have preferred not to intervene on the matter, leaving it to be settled by the HoR or the Commission on Appointment as the bodies directly involved. 

Therefore, Respondent Singson has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and entitled to assume his seat pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Political Question is a question of policy or those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. 

The parties invoked the case of Cunanan v. Tan, which provides the following:

In the 1961 election of the HoR, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party; 29 by the Liberal Party; and 1 by an independent. The representation in the Commission on Appointments are as follows: 8 from Nacionalista and 4 from the Liberal Party. 

Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party joined with the Liberal Party under an Allied Majority and installed a new Speaker and reorganized the House. As a result, 3 from the Nacionalista Party in the Commission on Appointments were replaced by 3 of their colleagues who joined the Allied Majority.

Carlos Cunanan, the Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments and instead, designated Jorge Tan, Jr. Cunanan then contended that the rejection of his appointment was void because the Commission on Appointments itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court ruled the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the HoR. The Allied Majority does not suffice to authorize the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments. It was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista Party defectors had not disaffiliated from their party. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. 

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs

TOPIC: If a non-governmental function or proprietary act is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

FACTS:

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts amounting to over 18K. 

The lower court dismissed the complaint as neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. 

The Plaintiff argued that not all government entities are immune from suit especially when government entities are discharging proprietary functions such as engaging in arrastre service.  

ISSUE:

WON the Customs Arrastre Service of the Bureau of Customs is immune from suit.

RULING:

Yes. 

If a proprietary function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. 

In this case, the Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance. Its primary function is governmental, that is, assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. The arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, but it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. Hence, engaging in the arraste service does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Therefore, the Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

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DISCUSSION:

Why is arrastre service deemed as an incident to the governmental function of the Bureau of Customs?

For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

What should be done by the Plaintiff?

Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands

TOPIC: An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability unless it is clearly expressed in the act. 

FACTS:

Plaintiff Meritt figured out a collision against the ambulance of the General Hospital which made him severely injured. He was awarded the amount of P14,741. 

The plaintiff requested to increase the amount of damages as he was wholly incapacitated for six months. It was an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.

Under Act. No. 2457, it was acknowledged that the claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. 

ISSUE:

WON the act also concedes the states liability to the plaintiff.

RULING:

No.

An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability. The state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. 

Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. In reference to Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of the state is limited only to acts through a special agent. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot hold the state liable absence of an express legislative enactment appropriating sufficient funds therefor. [The matter rests solely with the legislature and not with the courts].

Republic v. Feliciano

TOPICS: Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body; Waiver of immunity should be strictly construed against the state. 

FACTS:

Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcels of land which were reserved for settlement purposes under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) per Proclamation No. 90.

The intervenors filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic cannot be sued without its consent 

ISSUE:

WON the government has waived its immunity from suit.  

RULING:

No.

Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris.

In this case, Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. A Proclamation is not a legislative act. Hence, the state has not given its consent to be sued. 

Therefore, there was no consent given by the state for it be liable. [the complaint was dismissed as the possessory information under the Spanish Mortgage Law he presented cannot establish proof of ownership or exclusion of the land in the NARRA].

Republic v. Sandoval

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; A suit against the state is proper when the [1] republic is sued by name, [2] the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and [3] when the suit is on its face against the government officer but the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. 

FACTS:

The heirs of the deceased during the Mendiola Massacre on January 22, 1987 filed a case for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel involved in the incident. 

The petitioners argued that the State waived its immunity from suit on the basis of the report issued by the Citizens’ Mendiola Commission organized by Pres. Aquino. 

The Commission recommended the government to indemnify the heirs and the victims of the Mendiola incident. 

ISSUE:

WON the case qualifies as a suit against the state. 

RULING:

No, the case is not a suit against the state.

A suit against the state is proper when the Republic is sued by name, the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and that the ultimate liability belongs to the government. 

In this case, the military officers and personnel exceeded their authority in the discharge of their official functions. They Committee report found that there was a lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms and there were unnecessary firing. Hence, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government

Therefore, the case does not qualify as a suit against the estate. [the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court]

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DISCUSSION:

The report of the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The findings only serve as the cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate his/her claim. The Commission, being a fact-finding body, is merely a preliminary venue. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory.

US v. Guinto

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit or the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty;  Doctrine of Incorporation; Express Consent is effected only by a statute; Implied consent exists when the government enters into a contract, but distinction has to be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts

FACTS:

The case is a consolidation of cases invoking the doctrine of state immunity. 

GR No. 76607 - petitioners are several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base were sued in connection with the bidding for barbering services. The petitioner filed a motion to dims on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived its nonsuability. 

GR No. 7940 - the defendant is an officer of the US Air Force at John Hay Air Station who was sued for allegedly effecting a dismissal against an employee, a cook in the Main Club, who had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. 

GR No. 80018 - petitioners are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators who arrested Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Cam O’Donnell, for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. 

GR No. 80258 - the plaintiff was allegedly beaten up, handcuffed, and bitten by unleashed dogs of the defendants who invoked immunity from suit

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of state immunity may be invoked in the abovementioned cases.  

RULING:

I. For GR No. 76607

No, the officers of the U.S. Air Force cannot invoke immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered into barbershop concessionaires who, under the terms of their contracts, are required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. Hence, the contracts entered into are commercial and is proprietary act of the US government. 

However, the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Supreme Court. The case was remanded for the respondent court to receive evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.

II. For GR No. 7940

No, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered an employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function such as the establishment of the Main Club. Hence, the US government divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. [However, it was found that the termination of the cook was valid]

Therefore, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

III. For GR No. 80018

Yes, the officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

The doctrine of immunity from suit is applicable to officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

In this case, the petitioners were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts.

Therefore, the officers can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

IV. For GR 80258

The Court cannot decide yet if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Hence, the case was remanded for trial.

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DISCUSSIONS:

A state may not be sued without its consent. 

BASES: 

[1] Express provision in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution

[2] It is a generally accepted principle in the international law

[3] Even if there was no express provision, it is deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations based on the doctrine of incorporation

[4] There can be no legal rights against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.

[5] All states are sovereign equals and cannot asserts jurisdiction over one another. 

APPLICATION:

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state, it is also applicable to complaints filed against the officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

TYPES OF CONSENT:

Express Consent - it is effected only through a duly enacted statute

Implied Consent - it is effected when the government enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government.

Sanders v. Veridiano

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; 

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City, while Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.   

The private respondents are gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. Their employment was converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. The hearing officer ruled for their reinstatement plus backwages. However, Petitioners disagreed with the hearing officer’s report and were allegedly accused of issuing libelous imputations against the private respondents. Hence, they were sued in their personal capacities. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioners may be sued.

RULING:

No.

A government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers. Conversely, a mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.

In this case, the fact that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities does not automatically remove them from the protection of the law. Moreover, Petitioner Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Moreover, Petitioner Moreau was the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Hence, petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government, who acted within the scope of their authority. 

Moreover, a state cannot be sued without its consent. In this case, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners. 

Therefore, the Petitioners cannot be sued as the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts. 

Festejo v. Fernando

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Petitioner Festejo accused the Defendant Director of Public Works for constructing an irrigation canal on her 3 parcels of land. 

ISSUE:

WON the Defendant may be sued being the Director of Public Works

RULING:

I.

Yes.

Under the law, officer or employee may be sued as any other citizen if an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law. 

In this case, the Director of Public Works went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness. Hence, the Director of Public Works must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Therefore, the Defendant may be sued.

USA v. Reyes

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Respondent Montoya is an American citizen working as the ID checker at the US Navy Exchange at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (NEX JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner Bradford, also an American citizen, was the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters. 

The Respondent filed a complaint concerning the alleged discriminatory acts committed by the petitioner in excess of her authority as the store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. 

The Petitioner, together with the US Government, filed a Motion to Dismiss as the case was a suit against the USA, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent. The respondent argued that the complained act was conducted at the parking lot, outside the JUSMAG Store and that Petitioner does not possess diplomatic immunity. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioner possesses diplomatic immunity.

RULING:

I.

No.   

Under the doctrine of immunity from suit, a state may not be sued without its consent. The immunity applies against officials of states for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties. However, unauthorized acts of government officials or where public officials are being sued in their private and personal capacity are not suit against the state. 

In this case, Petitioner Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. Petitioner’s illegal search on the Respondent’s person and belongings was conducted outside the JUSMAG premises. 

Therefore, Petitioner, who was sued for the unauthorized act outside of the scope of her authority and was sued in her personal capacity cannot enjoy of the immunity from suit. 

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DISCUSSION:

General Rule: A state may not be sued without its consent. It is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

Exception: [1] Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State and [2] where public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. Thus, they are not a suit against the state. 

The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Basis: Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution and the generally accepted principles of international law. 

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.

Sanidad v. COMELEC

TOPICS:  legal standing, jusiticiable and political question, referendum and plebiscite

FACTS:

Petitioners Sanidad sought to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, 1976 per PD 1031 and to declare without effect PD 991, PD 1033.

Presidential Decree No. 991 - calls for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve the issues of Martial law, the Interim Assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period for its existence, and the length of period for the exercise by the President.

Presidential Decree No. 1033 - it provides the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum plebiscite: 1) Do you want martial law to be continued? 2) WON you want ML to be continued, do you approve the ff. amendments of the Consti? a) in lieu of the interim National Assembly, there shall be an interim Batasang Pambasna composed of the President and representatives and those chosen members of the Cabinet. 

Moreover, petitioners contend that there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. 

ISSUE:

I) WON the petitioners have the legal standing to challenge the PDs

II) WON the issue involves a political question

RULING:

I.

Yes, the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers. They have an interest over the lawful expenditure of the funds appropriated in the PDs. In this case, PD 1031 appropriates 8M, while PD 991 appropriates 5M.  

II.

No, the issue is a justiciable question. 

Under the 1973 Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. 

In this case, the validity of PD 1031, 991, and 1033 are assailed as invalid. Thus, the issue of the validity of the decrees is plainly justiciable. More so that the judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution whether the procedure is followed in amending the Constitution or the authority assumed by the President to propose amendments was valid or not. 

Therefore, the question was justiciable which can be passed upon the court.

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DISCUSSION:

There are two periods in the constitutional life of the nation:

1) Period of Normalcy

2) Period of Transition

In the period of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposal of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.

The calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. 

In the period of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.

The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. 

In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.

A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts. 

A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election."

Political questions are associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular fact.