How to construe "and" and "or"?

TOPIC

1. "And" - exceptions to conjunctive construction

Microsoft Corp. vs. Manansala

FACTS:

The subject of the statutory construction here is Section 29 of P.D. No. 49, which states that:

Section 5. Copyright shall consist in the exclusive right: 

(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell, and make photographs, photo-engravings, and pictorial illsutrations of the works. 

Manansala is doing business under the name of Dataman Trading Company and/or Comic Alley. He was engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs. 

The public prosecutor and the DOJ, after a petition for review, dismissed the charge of copyright infringement. The CA, after a petition for certiorari, affirmed the dismissal. 

The petitioner insisted that the printing and copying are not essential in the commission of the crime even if the word used is "and".

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the conjunctive "and" should be taken in its ordinary meaning. 

RULING:

No.

Under the rule on statutory construction, the conjunctive "and" should not be taken in its ordinary acceptation, but should be construed like the disjunctive "or" if the literal interpretation of the law would pervert or obscure the legislative intent. 

In this case, the literal interpretation would obscure the legislative intent. To require that the computer program be first photographes, photo-engraved, or pictorially illustrated as a condition for the commission of copyright infringement invites ridicule. The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough. 

Therefore, the conjunctive "and" should be construed like the disjunctive "or".

  

How to interpret wills?

 TOPIC

1. Special or technical meaning

Abella vs. Sumayod

FACTS:

The subject of the statutory construction here is paragraph 5 of the last will and testament of Josefina Abella which states that:

"I devise and bequeath to CECILIA E. ABELLA, my land containing an area of ONE THOUSAND & FIFTY-FIVE (1,055 [SQ.] M.) SQUARE METERS, covered by TCT No. T-4561, with Tax Decl. No. 47901, located at Sagkan II, Brgy. 59, under Lot 2685-A in my name; this will also include my share in Lot 12054 of MAURO ABELLA and JOSE O. ABELLA, under Title No. 1567, Lot 2741-C, and my just share in Lot 2440 part B-2, including my just share from the Pawing, Palo, Properties in the name of Jose O. Abella will go to CECILIA E. ABELLA, the share of IRENE ABELLA will go to SOLEDAD AMAGO and the share of TEODORO O. ABELLA will go to CONRADA C. ABELLA who did all the legal preparation and typing of documents are researcher of Cecilia E. Abella and as my secretary, and the share of LEON ABELLA will go to ANESIA ABELLA & sisters."

The surviving heirs of Soledad, Conrada, and Anesia (Rizalino, et al.) contacted Atty. Sergio Sumayod (the executor) and Jane, the caretaker, to proceed with the distribution of the Pawing, Palo Properties, in favor of their predecessors by virtue of Paragraph 5. But Atty. Sumayod and Jane refused. 

Then, Rizalino et al. filed a Motion to Appoint Special Executor and Execute Last Will and Testament before the RTC.

The RTC denied and held that Josefina did not own the Pawing, Palo Properties. The CA upheld the decision. 

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not paragraph 5 should be given effect?

RULING:

No.

Under the principle of separability in statutory construction, the invalidity of one of the several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made.

In this case, the invalidity of the dispositions contained in the will, particularly the transfer of the Pawing Properties to Rizalino et al., which are not owned by Josefina, does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions. 

Therefore, paragraph 5 should be given effect insofar as those valid provisions are concerned. 

  

How to construe "may" and "shall"?

TOPIC

1. Interpretation of "shall" and "may"  

Moncayo vs. Moncayo

FACTS:

The subject of the statutory construction here is Section 5(4) of the A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 

On June 4, 2018, Edwin filed a petition to declare his marriage with Aileen void for having been solemnized without a marriage license as required under Article 35(3) of the Family Code. He alleged that the ML does not exist and was not presented before the solemnizing officer.

Aileen prayed for the outright dismissal of Edwin's Petition on the ground that Edwin failed to serve a copy of his petition to the OSG and the OCP within 5 days from filing. Under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

SECTION 5. Contents and Form of Petition.

—

. . .

xxx xxx xxx

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.

Failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be ground for immediate dismissal of the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the belated compliance with Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC warrants outright dismissal of the Petition. 

RULING:

No.

Under the rules on statutory construction, the word "shall" means imperative and not permissive, though it may have the latter meaning when required by the context.

In this case, it is imperative for the petitioner in the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages to serve a copy of the petition to the OSG and the OCP within 5 days from the filing of the petition. However, the use of the word, "may" in relation to the petition's dismissal in case of failure to comply means that the "shall" is meant to be interpreted to be consistent with the use of discretion. 

Therefore, the belated compliance with Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not warrant outright dismissal as the same belongs to the discretion of the court.

  

When do courts resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of the bill's due enactment?

       TOPICS:

1. Enrolled bill doctrine
2. Congressional journals

Astorga vs. Villegas

FACTS:

Prior to its approval, HB 9266, a bill of local application, went into several amendments in the Senate. During the deliberation in the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities, Senator Roxas recommended that the President Protempore of the Municipal Board, instead of the City Engineer, should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. Moreover, during the second reading, Senator Tolentino introduced further amendments. 

Eventually, the Tolentino amendments, which were actually approved by the Senate, were not reflected in the bill certified and attested by the Secretary of the HoR, Speaker of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President. 

HB 9266 then became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."

Senator Tolentino reacted that the President signed the wrong version of the bill. The Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, invalidated their signatures in the enrolled bill. In effect, the President communicated to the presiding officers of both Houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature. 

Manila Mayor Villegas implemented circulars disregarding the provisions of RA 4065 and recalled actions brought under the authority of the law. Vice-Mayor Astorga objected and sought the application of the law. In addition, when the Mayor was on an official trip, the court enjoined the Vice-Mayor from exercising the powers of an Acting Mayor conferred upon RA 4065. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4065 took effect. 

RULING: 

No, RA 4065 did not take effect. 

Under the rules on statutory construction, if the attestation is absent, courts may resort to the journals and other records of the Congress for proof of its due enactment. 

In this case, when the Senate President and the Secretary of the Senate withdrew their signatures to the enrolled bill, HB 9266, the Court resorted to the journal of the proceedings of the Congress, which discloses the approval made but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President. 

Thus, when the approval disclosed in the journal was not reflected in the enrolled bill, the bill was deemed to have not been duly enacted and did not become a law. Therefore, RA 4065 did not take effect. 

  

What are the grounds for changing the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC by a paty-list organization?

      TOPICS:

1. Grounds for changing the order of nominees in the party-list organization.
2. Requisites of a valid IRR  

Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), through its President, Joel Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of their nominees for the 2007 elections. 

As submitted before the COMELEC, CIBAC's nominees are in the following order: Villanueva, Lokin, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang. However, Villanueva sought that COMELEC confirm the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang, and approve the following new nominees in the following order: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, and Borje. 

The COMELEC approved the new nominees by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804. Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 recognizes the withdrawal of a nominee by the party as one of the exceptions in the general rule that no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC's Resolution No. 7804 approving CIBAC's petition for withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and others and its substitution of them with new nominees was valid. 

RULING: 

I. 

No, COMELEC Resolution No. 7804, which approves CIBAC's petition for withdrawal, nomination, and substitution, is not valid. 

The Supreme Court ruled that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.

In this case, Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 exclusively enumerates the three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated." However, Section 13 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it added "withdrawal by the party" as a ground for substituting a nominee in a party-list. 

Therefore, the inclusion of withdrawal by the party as among the exceptions exclusively enumerated under the law is invalid. Thus, approval of the petition of CIBAC to withdraw Lokin as one of its nominees is invalid.