Second Placer Rule vs. Rule of Succession; Three Classifications of Domicile; Requisites of Domicile by Choice

TOPICS:

1. Second Placer Rule has no legal basis, thus, the Rule on Succession shall govern when a permanent vacancy is created after the winning candidate is disqualified from the office to which he was elected. 
2. The three classifications of domicile are domicile of origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law. 
3. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; the intention to remain there for an indefinite period of time; and the intention to abandon the old domicile. The last two requisites were not complied with by Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu. 

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu vs. COMELEC, et al. 

FACTS:

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu was the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Abdullah Sangki (DAS), Magunidanao, after winning the May 2019 elections. While being a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, Pax Ali filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Provincial Governor of Sultan Kudarat on October 7, 2021. Subsequently, Pax Ali resigned as Mayor of DAS, Maguindanao on November 15, 2021, and won during the May 2022 elections. 

Pax Ali’s opponent, Sharifa Akeel Mangudadatu, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel his COC on the ground that he misrepresented in his COC that he had been residing in Sultan Kudarat for at least one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, when in fact he was still a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, being their municipal mayor. 

Pax Ali argued that his domicile of origin was at Sultan Kudarat. However, he temporarily transferred to DAS, Maguindanao, in compliance with his residency requirement for the position of Mayor. He further argued that despite this, he always had the inherent intention to return to his roots in Sultan Kudarat. 

Both the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc ruled that Pax Ali committed a material misrepresentation as regards his residence in Sultan Kudarat.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC when he ran for the position of Governor in Sultan Kudarat
2. If so, whether or not the second placer rule or the rule of succession will govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat.

RULING: 

I. 

Yes, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

The Local Government Code provides that a governor must be a resident of the province where he intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. 

In this case, Pax Ali stated in his COC that he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for 1 year and 8 months before the May 9, 2022 elections. However, it was only on November 15, 2021, when Pax Ali resigned as the Mayor of DAS. Counting from said date, he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for only 5 months and 22 days immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections. This shows that Pax Ali’s resignation as Mayor and acquisition of a new domicile in Sultan Kudarat were done too late.  

Therefore, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

II.

The rule of succession shall govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat. 

The Local Government Code provides that with respect to vacancies in the Office of the Governor, the Vice Governor shall become the Governor.  A permanent vacancy is created when the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected. 

Therefore, the above concern calls for the application of the rule on succession.

DISCUSSIONS:

Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. There are three classifications of domicile: 

1. Domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; 
2. Domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
1. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; an intention to remain there (not met by Pax Ali); and an intention to abandon the old domicile (not met by Pax Ali).
1. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
3. Domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person, independently of his residence or intention

Apart from Pax Ali's failure to effect a change of domicile from DAS Maguindanao to Sultan Kudarat, one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, Pax Ali’s intention to remain in Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao are missing. 

Pax Ali’s intention to maintain a residence in Sultan Kudarat and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao became manifest only when he resigned as Mayor of DAS on November 15, 2021 – a mere afterthought. Clinging to his position as Mayor in DAS Maguindanao when Pax Ali filed his COC as Governor in Sultan Kudarat earlier on October 7, 2021 meant that he must comply with the continuing requirement of remaining a resident of DAS, Maguindanao during his entire tenure. Jurisprudence dictates that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. These qualifications must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure. This renders questionable Pax Ali's bona fide intent to remain at Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period of time.

Moreover, since Pax Ali failed to show that he had established a new domicile at the time of the filing of his COC, his residency in DAS continues. He remained a resident of DAS, Maguindanao as of October 7, 2021.

The quantum of proof necessary to establish a change in domicile in election cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Full text here. 

Caltex v. Palomar

FACTS

Caltex (Philippines) Inc. organized a promotional scheme called, “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” wherein participants estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, accomplish it, and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Nowhere in the said rules requires any fee to be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.

Caltex would have to use mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communication. 

However, there is an anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. So, the Acting Postmaster General declined to grant the requested advance clearance for mailing, and if the contest will be conducted a fraud order will be issued. 

Caltex filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief to declare its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is covered under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law?

RULING

No, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the provisions of the Postal Law.

The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. Nowhere in the said rules provides for a requirement that any fee should be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.

Moreover, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a gift enterprise. 

A gift enterprise is a scheme for the distribution of money or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind. It is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. 

There is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

The term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.

The appellee, may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Full text here

De Castro v. JBC

FACTS

To fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno on May 17, 2010, the JBC was ordered to conduct with the proceedings for the nomination of candidates; prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; and submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees.

As argued by the OSG, the incumbent President has the power to appoint the next CJ.

Sec. 15, Article VII or the prohibition of the President to appoint 2 months immediately before the election does not cover appointments in the judiciary. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments?

RULING

Yes, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments.

The prohibition against the President or Acting President in making appointments within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the members of the SC. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. VII to the appointment of the members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. 

In this case, the President may appoint any members of the Supreme Court within 2 months before the next presidential elections. It is the imperative duty of the President under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from the occurrence. 

Therefore, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments. 

Full text here

 

Aytona v. Castillo

FACTS

A day before President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office on December 30, 1961, former President Carlos P. Garcia appointed 350 ad interim appointees. One of whom was Dominador Aytona, who was appointed as the Governor of the Central Bank. 

However, on December 31, 1961, Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date when he was proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, Andres Castillo was appointed by Macapagal as the Governor of the Central Bank.

Aytona was prevented from holding office at the Central Bank. Hence, a petition to disregard the Administrative Order No. 2 was filed in court. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels the midnight or last-minute appointment was valid?

RULING

Yes, Administrative Order No. 2 was valid. 

The administration of Garcia was no more than a caretaker administration after the proclamation of the election of the Macapagal on December 13, 1961. However, filling up of vacancies by Garcia in important positions, if few, with assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment may be permitted.

In this case, the issuance of 350 appointments in one night was regarded as an abuse of Presidential prerogative where the exercise of double care, which was required and expected of Garcia, was hard to believe. 

Therefore, there is no reason to disregard Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels midnight or last-minute appointments. 

Tobias v. Abalos

PRINCIPLES:

• The creation of a separate congressional district is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
• The present limit of 250 members in the HoR is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment.
• It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress (e.g. census) in the enactment of said laws.

FACTS: 

Petitioners as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC. Prior to the enactment, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. 

Petitioners argued that:

1. the law violated the “one subject-one bill” rule as it embraces 2 subjects: 1) conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC; and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into 2 separate districts. 
2. the division of the two districts resulted in the increase in the composition of the HoR contrary to Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution
3. the division was not made pursuant to any census. 

ISSUES:

I) WON RA 7675 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule.

II) WON RA 7675 violated the present limit of 250 members in the HOR

III) WON the absence of the census as a basis in enacting the law rendered RA 7675 unconstitutional.

RULING:

I.

No, RA 7675 did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

The SC held that the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. 

In this case, RA RA 7675 which is an act converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC necessarily includes and contemplates the subject regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. 

Therefore the law did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

II.

No, RA 7675 did not violate Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution.

Under the Constitution, the HoR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. 

Hence, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment such as RA 7675.

Therefore, RA 7675 did not violate the present limit of 250 members in the HoR. 

III.

No, absence of showing the census as a basis in the enactment of the law does not render RA 7675 unconstitutional.

The SC held that the law enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress in the enactment of said laws. 

Bengson III v. HRET

PRINCIPLE: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

FACTS: 

Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. 

On March 17, 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He rand and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. 

Bengson filed a Quo Warranto case with HRET claiming that Cruz is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article 6 [6] of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition. 

ISSUES 

I) WON Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING

I.

Yes, Cruz was reverted to its natural-born citizenship.

Under the law, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

In this case, Cruz was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by enlisting himself in the US Marine Corps. Hence, Cruz will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

Therefore, Cruz is considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 

DISCUSSION

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this  Constitution; 
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and 
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Two ways of acquiring citizenship: 1) by birth, and 2) by naturalization. 

Three ways of re-acquiring citizenship: 1) by naturalization; 2) by repatriation; and 3) by direct act of Congress.

Two kinds of citizens: 1) natural-born citizens, and 2) naturalized citizen.

• Natural-born citizens are Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
• Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition (governed by CA 473, as amended) and reacquisition (governed by CA 63). 

Repatriation is simply consists of taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. For example: If a naturalized Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino through repatriation or if a natural-born Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. 

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation (as in this case), Philippine Citizenship as an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office

FACTS: 

Juan G. Frivaldo was a former natural-born citizen who became a naturalized American citizen and then applied for repatriation on August 17, 1994 to reacquire his previous Filipino citizenship. He then run for Governor in the province of Sorsogon and obtained the highest number of votes during the May 1995 elections.

Raul S. Lee, the second placer in the canvass, sought for Frivaldo’s disqualification on the grounds that his repatriation was invalid, thus he was not a citizen nor a registered voter; that Frivaldo was barred from running after two disqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections, and that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition of Frivaldo nullifying his proclamation. 

ISSUES 

I) WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal so as to cure his lack of citizenship and to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold the Office of Governor.

II) WON the judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

III) WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. 

IV) WON the proclamation of Lee, the candidate the second highest number of votes, valid and legal.

V) WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions which prevented Frivaldo to assume the position, considering that they were not rendered within the 15-day period before the election.

RULING

I.

Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid.

Under PD 725, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of the Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Moreover, PD 725 is a remedial and curative law which seeks to cure the defect in the existing law causing the difficulty of natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Filipino citizenship. 

In this case, Frivaldo, garnered the highest number of votes in the May 1995 elections for the position of a Governor in Sorsogon.  He applied for a repatriation back in August 17, 1994 and took his oath of allegiance at 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. Hence, it he should have been proclaimed, not Lee, as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 PM on the said date since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship which is reckoned from the time of his filing. 

Therefore, Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid. 

As regards the arguments of Lee: 

a) That PD 725 or the Immigration Law was repealed through a Memorandum of Pres. Corazon Aquino - The SC ruled that laws are repealed only by subsequent laws. In this case, the Memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment but as an executive policy addressed by Pres. Aquino to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might make. In other words, it was left to the first Congress to deal the matter. Hence, PD 725, which Frivaldo sought to reacquire his citizenship, was not repealed. 

b) That the application of Frivaldo for repatriation was filed only on June 29, 1995 and was approved on June 30, 1995 - The SC ruled that the application for repatriation was filed with the OP in Malacañang on August 17, 1994. On June 29, 1995, he was asked to fill out and re-submit the form that the Committee required. Under repatriation, the applicant who was a former natural-born Filipino shall revert to such status.  Hence, Frivaldo who was a natural-born citizen shall revert to such status. 

c) That only Filipino citizens and registered voter can run and be elected to public office - As to citizenship, the SC ruled that although Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Citizenship can be reckoned from the date the official governs the people, the country, or a territory. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. In this case, Frivaldo reacquired his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the same day as the term for the Governor began. Hence, he is qualified in the citizenship requirement. As to being a registered voter, the SC ruled that Sec. 39 of the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of the qualification. In this case, Frivaldo is a registered voter of Sorsogon. 

II.

No, the judicially declared disqualifications of Frivaldo for lack of Filipino citizenship does not bar him to run for position.

The SC ruled that the previous disqualifications cannot govern a person’s status with finality as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship. Hence, the disqualifications against Frivaldo in the 1988 and 1992 elections cannot bar him to run again as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship.

III.

Yes, the COMELEC has the power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and disqualifications of all elective officials. 

Under the law, the power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following the proclamation.

In this case, the Frivaldo petition questioning Lee’s proclamation was filed only 6 days after the proclamation. Hence, COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the case. 

IV.

No, the proclamation of Lee, the candidate with the second highest number of votes, was not valid.

Under the law, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

In this case, Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Hence, he should be proclaimed and not Lee. 

V.

No, the COMELEC did not exceed in jurisdiction when it issued Resolutions disqualifying him for want of citizenship even if it were rendered beyond the 15-day period as prescribed under Section 78.

The SC ruled that the Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Citizenship shall reckon from the day the official begins to govern or to discharge his functions, that is, upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Quo warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

Santiago v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Initiative to the Constitution, Delegation of Power

FACTS:

Pursuant to Article XVII [2] of the 1987 Constitution , Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.” As required under the COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country to reach the Constitutional threshold on the number of signatures to be gathered based on the conduct of People’s Initiative. 

Senator Santiago, among others, filed a special action for prohibition on the said petition based on the following arguments:

1. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. 

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.

3. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not revision. 

ISSUE:

1. WON the Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition. 

The issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary

RULING:

I.

No, the provision is not self-executory. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 

RA 6735, which provides for the 3 systems of initiative, is incomplete as it failed to provide the details in implementing the initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Consequently, having failed to satisfy the requirements of subordinate legislation, the delegation of the power to COMELEC is invalid. Therefore, COMELEC has no power in promulgating rules in the implementation of the amendment through people’s initiative.

II.

No, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. More so that it is merely entered as undocketed.

-----------------------------------

DISCUSSIONS:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

There are three (3) systems of initiative per RA 6735, namely:

1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution (lacking in RA 6735);

2. Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

The COMELEC rule is a delegation of legislative authority. It is valid only if the law:

1. is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (lacking in RA 6735);

2. fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (lacking in RA 6735);

General Rule:  What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Exception:

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

3. Delegation to the people at large;

4. Delegation to local governments; and

5. Delegation to administrative bodies (empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules is a form of delegation of legislative authority) 

The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are

1. to prescribe the form of the petition;

2. to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;

3. to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and

4. to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

TOPICS: Environmental laws governing various government agencies; Writ of Continuing Mandamus

FACTS:

Respondents Concern Citizens of Manila Bay filed a complaint against several government agencies for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law. 

The RTC ordered petitioners to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and the CA sustained the RTC Decision. 

The petitioners argued that, under Section 20 of PD 1152, they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations and that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which is subject to a mandamus. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the Section 20 of PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents 

II. WON the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act that cannot be compelled by mandamus. 

RULING:

I.

No, Section 20 of PD 1152 should be read in complementary with Section 17 of PD 1152 which covers cleaning in general and not to specific pollution incidents only. 

Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters' account. However, the Petitioners cannot invoke and hide behind Section 20.

Section 17 of of PD 1152 or the Environment Code does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Section 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage". This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards". In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

II.

Yes, the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act that can compelled by a mandamus. 

A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. The enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature. 

In this case, the Court ruled that the petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Therefore, cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act of the government agencies which is subject to a mandamus.

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DISCUSSIONS:

Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. In the case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed to the men and women representing the future generations of Filipinos.

[1] Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)

RA 7924 or the law creating the MMDA

• Section 3 - provides for the waste disposal services of MMDA. 

RA 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act)

• Section 41 - prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
• Section 42 - provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill.
• Section 36 and 37 - enjoining MMDA and LGUs, among others, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, 5 years after effectivity of RA 9003, the use of controlled dumps. 
• Section 48, Chapter VI - (prohibited acts - dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or nonbiodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

PD 1152 (Philippine Environmental Code) outlines MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal. 

RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)

• Section 28 - the MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, may cause the eviction or demolition of persons or entities who occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds.

[2] Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

EO 192 - DENR is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

Section 19 - designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for the enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. It also confers the DENR a jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution and to determine its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. It also instructed DENR to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas

[3] Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)

PD 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973)- grants LWUA the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)- the LWUA, as attached agency of DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the county.   

[4] Department of Agriculture (DA)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) - DA is tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. 

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) - DA, in coordination with LGUs and other concerned sectors, is in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

• Sectin 22 [c] - The BFAR shall be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. 

[5] Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)- DPWH is tasked to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

[6] Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)

PD 601 (Revised Cost Guard Law of 1974)

• Section 5  and Section 6 - PCG shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. 

[7] Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) - PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. 

• Section 86 - the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions.

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998)

• Sec. 124 - both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.

[8] Philippine Port Authority (PPA)

EO 513  

• Section 2 - PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."
• Sec. 6-c - PPA has the police authority within the ports administered by it to carry out its powers and functions, without prejudice to the functions of the Bureau of Customs. It has the power to regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port or watercraft

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78 - the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, PPA is tasked to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels. 

[9] Department of Health (DOH)

PD 1067 (Water Code)

• Article 76 - DOH is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use.
• Article 51 - (though not the task of DOH, but under the same law) - it is prohibited to build structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways: The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind . 

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

• Section 8 - DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system.

PD 856 (Code of Sanitation of the Philippines)

• Section 72 and Section 5.1.1 of Chapter XVII - the DOH is ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

[10] Department of Education (DepEd)

PD 1152 (Philippine Environmental Code) - DepEd is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998)

• Section 118 - the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, CHED, and PIA, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment.

[11] Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)

• Section 2 - DBM should ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country's development objectives.

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004) - the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Daza v. Singson

TOPICS: Political Question and Justiciable Question; Proportional representation from the political parties to the Commission on Appointments 

FACTS:

Petitioner Daza was a representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments. When the 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the members of LDP increased to 159, while the Liberal Party was left with 17 members. 

In effect, the HoR revised its representation in the Commission on Appointment by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and gave it to Luis Singson from the newly-formed LDP. 

Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the 12 members of the HoR in the Commission on Appointment shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties. 

Daza argued that the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission on Appointment is not based on a permanent political realignment as the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. 

Singson also argued that the question raised was political in nature, that is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Further, Singson argued that the transfer of the 24 members to the LDP was permanent. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the issue is a political question.

II. WON the Constitution contemplates that the members from the Commission on Appointments should come from a political party that has “aged” enough

III. WON the HoR can change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. 

RULING:

I.

No, the issue involves a justiciable question.  

Under the law, a justiciable question is one that involves the legality and not the wisdom of an act complained of. 

In this case, the question involves the manner of filling the Commission on Appointment as prescribed by the Constitution. Assuming arguendo that it was a political question, it is still within the power of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case. 

II.

No. The requirement that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.

The Liberal Party, a faction from the Nacionalista Party, was created in 1945 to support Manuel Roxas’s bid for the Presidency. It was 4 months old then but no question was raised as to its representation in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunal. It was the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

In this case, the LDP has been in existence for more than 1 year. 

Therefore, the Constitution does not contemplate that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence as basis for its representation in the Commission on Appointment. 

III.

Yes, the HoR has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.

It is understood that such changes must be [1] permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or [2] formal disaffiliation and [3] permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. 

The Court would have preferred not to intervene on the matter, leaving it to be settled by the HoR or the Commission on Appointment as the bodies directly involved. 

Therefore, Respondent Singson has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and entitled to assume his seat pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Political Question is a question of policy or those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. 

The parties invoked the case of Cunanan v. Tan, which provides the following:

In the 1961 election of the HoR, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party; 29 by the Liberal Party; and 1 by an independent. The representation in the Commission on Appointments are as follows: 8 from Nacionalista and 4 from the Liberal Party. 

Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party joined with the Liberal Party under an Allied Majority and installed a new Speaker and reorganized the House. As a result, 3 from the Nacionalista Party in the Commission on Appointments were replaced by 3 of their colleagues who joined the Allied Majority.

Carlos Cunanan, the Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments and instead, designated Jorge Tan, Jr. Cunanan then contended that the rejection of his appointment was void because the Commission on Appointments itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court ruled the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the HoR. The Allied Majority does not suffice to authorize the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments. It was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista Party defectors had not disaffiliated from their party. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. 

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs

TOPIC: If a non-governmental function or proprietary act is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

FACTS:

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts amounting to over 18K. 

The lower court dismissed the complaint as neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. 

The Plaintiff argued that not all government entities are immune from suit especially when government entities are discharging proprietary functions such as engaging in arrastre service.  

ISSUE:

WON the Customs Arrastre Service of the Bureau of Customs is immune from suit.

RULING:

Yes. 

If a proprietary function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. 

In this case, the Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance. Its primary function is governmental, that is, assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. The arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, but it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. Hence, engaging in the arraste service does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Therefore, the Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

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DISCUSSION:

Why is arrastre service deemed as an incident to the governmental function of the Bureau of Customs?

For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

What should be done by the Plaintiff?

Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.

Republic v. Sandoval

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; A suit against the state is proper when the [1] republic is sued by name, [2] the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and [3] when the suit is on its face against the government officer but the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. 

FACTS:

The heirs of the deceased during the Mendiola Massacre on January 22, 1987 filed a case for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel involved in the incident. 

The petitioners argued that the State waived its immunity from suit on the basis of the report issued by the Citizens’ Mendiola Commission organized by Pres. Aquino. 

The Commission recommended the government to indemnify the heirs and the victims of the Mendiola incident. 

ISSUE:

WON the case qualifies as a suit against the state. 

RULING:

No, the case is not a suit against the state.

A suit against the state is proper when the Republic is sued by name, the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and that the ultimate liability belongs to the government. 

In this case, the military officers and personnel exceeded their authority in the discharge of their official functions. They Committee report found that there was a lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms and there were unnecessary firing. Hence, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government

Therefore, the case does not qualify as a suit against the estate. [the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court]

-------------- 

DISCUSSION:

The report of the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The findings only serve as the cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate his/her claim. The Commission, being a fact-finding body, is merely a preliminary venue. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory.

US v. Guinto

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit or the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty;  Doctrine of Incorporation; Express Consent is effected only by a statute; Implied consent exists when the government enters into a contract, but distinction has to be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts

FACTS:

The case is a consolidation of cases invoking the doctrine of state immunity. 

GR No. 76607 - petitioners are several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base were sued in connection with the bidding for barbering services. The petitioner filed a motion to dims on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived its nonsuability. 

GR No. 7940 - the defendant is an officer of the US Air Force at John Hay Air Station who was sued for allegedly effecting a dismissal against an employee, a cook in the Main Club, who had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. 

GR No. 80018 - petitioners are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators who arrested Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Cam O’Donnell, for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. 

GR No. 80258 - the plaintiff was allegedly beaten up, handcuffed, and bitten by unleashed dogs of the defendants who invoked immunity from suit

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of state immunity may be invoked in the abovementioned cases.  

RULING:

I. For GR No. 76607

No, the officers of the U.S. Air Force cannot invoke immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered into barbershop concessionaires who, under the terms of their contracts, are required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. Hence, the contracts entered into are commercial and is proprietary act of the US government. 

However, the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Supreme Court. The case was remanded for the respondent court to receive evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.

II. For GR No. 7940

No, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered an employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function such as the establishment of the Main Club. Hence, the US government divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. [However, it was found that the termination of the cook was valid]

Therefore, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

III. For GR No. 80018

Yes, the officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

The doctrine of immunity from suit is applicable to officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

In this case, the petitioners were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts.

Therefore, the officers can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

IV. For GR 80258

The Court cannot decide yet if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Hence, the case was remanded for trial.

-------------------------- 

DISCUSSIONS:

A state may not be sued without its consent. 

BASES: 

[1] Express provision in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution

[2] It is a generally accepted principle in the international law

[3] Even if there was no express provision, it is deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations based on the doctrine of incorporation

[4] There can be no legal rights against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.

[5] All states are sovereign equals and cannot asserts jurisdiction over one another. 

APPLICATION:

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state, it is also applicable to complaints filed against the officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

TYPES OF CONSENT:

Express Consent - it is effected only through a duly enacted statute

Implied Consent - it is effected when the government enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government.