Santiago v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Initiative to the Constitution, Delegation of Power

FACTS:

Pursuant to Article XVII [2] of the 1987 Constitution , Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.” As required under the COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country to reach the Constitutional threshold on the number of signatures to be gathered based on the conduct of People’s Initiative. 

Senator Santiago, among others, filed a special action for prohibition on the said petition based on the following arguments:

1. The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. 

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution.

3. The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not revision. 

ISSUE:

1. WON the Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the Delfin Petition. 

The issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary

RULING:

I.

No, the provision is not self-executory. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 

RA 6735, which provides for the 3 systems of initiative, is incomplete as it failed to provide the details in implementing the initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Consequently, having failed to satisfy the requirements of subordinate legislation, the delegation of the power to COMELEC is invalid. Therefore, COMELEC has no power in promulgating rules in the implementation of the amendment through people’s initiative.

II.

No, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in entertaining the Delfin Petition.

The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. More so that it is merely entered as undocketed.

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DISCUSSIONS:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

There are three (3) systems of initiative per RA 6735, namely:

1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution (lacking in RA 6735);

2. Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and

3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

The COMELEC rule is a delegation of legislative authority. It is valid only if the law:

1. is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (lacking in RA 6735);

2. fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. (lacking in RA 6735);

General Rule:  What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. Exception:

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

3. Delegation to the people at large;

4. Delegation to local governments; and

5. Delegation to administrative bodies (empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body, to promulgate rules is a form of delegation of legislative authority) 

The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are

1. to prescribe the form of the petition;

2. to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;

3. to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and

4. to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election

USA v. Reyes

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Respondent Montoya is an American citizen working as the ID checker at the US Navy Exchange at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (NEX JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner Bradford, also an American citizen, was the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters. 

The Respondent filed a complaint concerning the alleged discriminatory acts committed by the petitioner in excess of her authority as the store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. 

The Petitioner, together with the US Government, filed a Motion to Dismiss as the case was a suit against the USA, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent. The respondent argued that the complained act was conducted at the parking lot, outside the JUSMAG Store and that Petitioner does not possess diplomatic immunity. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioner possesses diplomatic immunity.

RULING:

I.

No.   

Under the doctrine of immunity from suit, a state may not be sued without its consent. The immunity applies against officials of states for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties. However, unauthorized acts of government officials or where public officials are being sued in their private and personal capacity are not suit against the state. 

In this case, Petitioner Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. Petitioner’s illegal search on the Respondent’s person and belongings was conducted outside the JUSMAG premises. 

Therefore, Petitioner, who was sued for the unauthorized act outside of the scope of her authority and was sued in her personal capacity cannot enjoy of the immunity from suit. 

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DISCUSSION:

General Rule: A state may not be sued without its consent. It is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

Exception: [1] Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State and [2] where public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. Thus, they are not a suit against the state. 

The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Basis: Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution and the generally accepted principles of international law. 

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.

ABSCBN Broadcasting v. CA

FACTS:

ABSCBN entered into a Film Exhibition Agreement with Viva Production, Inc., where the former was given an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. However, there are two versions of the agreement:

1) Mr. Eugenio Lopez III, General Manager of ABSCBN, asserted that ABSCBN was granted with a film rights to fourteen (14) films for a total consideration of P36 million. 

2) However, Mr. Vicente Del Rosario insisted that the agreement covers 104 films for a total price of P60 million.

A counterproposal from Mrs. Charo Concio covering 53 films  for a consideration of P35 million was then rejected by Viva’s Board of Directors. 

Following the rejection, the 104 Viva-produced films were granted to RBS, which prompted ABSCBN to file for a TRO against the RBS, Viva Production, and Del Rosario. This resulted to the non-showing of the film “Maging Sino Ka Man” in RBS on the day of its supposed showing.  

The RTC and CA ruled that the contract was not perfected and granted RBS damages due to ABSCBN’s complaint.  

ISSUES:

I. WON there was a perfected contract between VIVA and ABS-CBN.

II. WON RBS is entitled to damages.

RULING:

I.

The contract between Viva Productions, Inc. and ABSCBN was not binding.

Under the law, corporate powers, such as the power to enter into contracts, are exercised by the Board of Directors, which power may be delegated to either an executive committee or officials or contracted managers. 

In this case, Del Rosario has no authority to bind a contract with ABS CBN until Viva’s BoD approves it. In fact, Viva’s Board of Director rejected ABS-CBN's counter-offer and insisted that the film package for 140 films be maintained. 

Therefore, the contract was not binding. 

II.

RBS is not entitled for moral damages and exemplary damages.

Under the law, the award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system.

In this case, it is RBS who claimed for moral damages. Hence, as a corporation, it cannot be entitled for such.  

Moreover, the claims for moral and exemplary damages are favored when there is an abuse of right on the part of the defendant. The elements of the abuse of right doctrine are: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

In this case, there is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith.

Therefore, RBS is not entitled for any damages. 

Yao Ka Sin Trading v. CA

TOPICS:

single proprietorship v. corporation;

all functions emanate from the BOD, unless those which are delegated to certain individuals for practicality;

constitution covers the illegal acts (even if not in the AOI)

FACTS:

Constancio Maglana, President and Chairman of the Board of Prime White Cement Corporation (PWCC) presented a letter-offer to Yao Ka Sin Trading through its manager, Henry Yao. 

The letter-offer regarding the sale of 45,000 bags of prime white cement was accepted by YKS. However, after its signing, the Board of Directors of PWCC disapproved the same. PWCC informed YKS regarding the disapproval. 

Notwithstanding the issue regarding the letter-offer, PWCC delivered only 10,000 bags of white cement to YKS under a new and separate contract (not as what was stated in the letter-offer). 

PWCC only committed the delivery of 10,000 bags but YKS insisted on the delivery of 45,000 bags.

YKS filed a Specific Performance with Damages against PWCC. In the Answer, PWCC alleged that YKS has no legal personality to sue; the letter-offer was rejected by its BoD, hence it was never consummated, but instead only agreed to sell 10,000 bags of white cement under a separate contract. 

RTC Decision:

Defendant was ordered to complete the delivery of 45,000 bags. Under the By-Laws of PWCC, the President (Maglana) was granted by the BoD to enter into an agreement or contract. Such contract or agreement is not be subject to the ratification of the BoD, but subject only to the declared objects and purpose of the corporation and existing laws. Hence, it was validly entered. 

CA Decision:

CA reversed the decision. The letter-offer was rejected by PWCC’s BOD. Maglana and Yao entered an unauthorized contract as Maglana was not authorized by the BoD nor was his action ratified by the BoD. Nowhere in the AOI nor By-Laws was he empowered to enter into a contract. Having no cause of action, YKS is not entitled to any relief. 

ISSUE:

I. WON Plaintiff Henry Yao has the capacity to sue on behalf of YKS. - No

II. WON the letter-offer is binding with the respondent. - No

RULING:

I.  

No, Henry Yao lacks the capacity to sue.

Under the law, only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action and sole proprietorship is neither a natural person nor a juridical person. A sole proprietorship as a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file or defend an action in court. 

Here, Henry Yao filed the complaint being the manager of Yao Ka Sin Trading, which is a sole proprietorship. Hence, the proper party should be Yao Ka Sin, whose personality is not separate nor distinct from the sole proprietorship. 

Therefore, Henry Yao has no capacity to sue and Yao Ka Sin should be impleaded as a complainant.

II.

No, the letter-offer did not bind the respondent.

Under the law, a corporation can act only through its officers and agents who can bind the corporation in transactions with third persons to the extent of the authority conferred upon them. Based on PWCC’s By-Laws, the President can execute and sign for and in behalf of the corporation all contracts and agreements which the corporation may enter. The power to execute and sign presupposes a prior act of the corporation through the BoD. 

In this case, Mr. Maglana, the President of PWCC, entered into a contract with YKS for the corporation independently from the BOD or without prior Board approval. Maglana also failed to prove that he has the apparent authority to execute the contract.

Therefore, the contract was not binding with PWCC.

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The petitioner agreed to a new transaction after receiving the notification and accepted without any protest the delivery covering 10,000 bags.