Frivaldo v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation (as in this case), Philippine Citizenship as an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office

FACTS: 

Juan G. Frivaldo was a former natural-born citizen who became a naturalized American citizen and then applied for repatriation on August 17, 1994 to reacquire his previous Filipino citizenship. He then run for Governor in the province of Sorsogon and obtained the highest number of votes during the May 1995 elections.

Raul S. Lee, the second placer in the canvass, sought for Frivaldo’s disqualification on the grounds that his repatriation was invalid, thus he was not a citizen nor a registered voter; that Frivaldo was barred from running after two disqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections, and that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition of Frivaldo nullifying his proclamation. 

ISSUES 

I) WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal so as to cure his lack of citizenship and to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold the Office of Governor.

II) WON the judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

III) WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. 

IV) WON the proclamation of Lee, the candidate the second highest number of votes, valid and legal.

V) WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions which prevented Frivaldo to assume the position, considering that they were not rendered within the 15-day period before the election.

RULING

I.

Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid.

Under PD 725, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of the Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Moreover, PD 725 is a remedial and curative law which seeks to cure the defect in the existing law causing the difficulty of natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Filipino citizenship. 

In this case, Frivaldo, garnered the highest number of votes in the May 1995 elections for the position of a Governor in Sorsogon.  He applied for a repatriation back in August 17, 1994 and took his oath of allegiance at 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. Hence, it he should have been proclaimed, not Lee, as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 PM on the said date since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship which is reckoned from the time of his filing. 

Therefore, Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid. 

As regards the arguments of Lee: 

a) That PD 725 or the Immigration Law was repealed through a Memorandum of Pres. Corazon Aquino - The SC ruled that laws are repealed only by subsequent laws. In this case, the Memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment but as an executive policy addressed by Pres. Aquino to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might make. In other words, it was left to the first Congress to deal the matter. Hence, PD 725, which Frivaldo sought to reacquire his citizenship, was not repealed. 

b) That the application of Frivaldo for repatriation was filed only on June 29, 1995 and was approved on June 30, 1995 - The SC ruled that the application for repatriation was filed with the OP in Malacañang on August 17, 1994. On June 29, 1995, he was asked to fill out and re-submit the form that the Committee required. Under repatriation, the applicant who was a former natural-born Filipino shall revert to such status.  Hence, Frivaldo who was a natural-born citizen shall revert to such status. 

c) That only Filipino citizens and registered voter can run and be elected to public office - As to citizenship, the SC ruled that although Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Citizenship can be reckoned from the date the official governs the people, the country, or a territory. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. In this case, Frivaldo reacquired his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the same day as the term for the Governor began. Hence, he is qualified in the citizenship requirement. As to being a registered voter, the SC ruled that Sec. 39 of the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of the qualification. In this case, Frivaldo is a registered voter of Sorsogon. 

II.

No, the judicially declared disqualifications of Frivaldo for lack of Filipino citizenship does not bar him to run for position.

The SC ruled that the previous disqualifications cannot govern a person’s status with finality as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship. Hence, the disqualifications against Frivaldo in the 1988 and 1992 elections cannot bar him to run again as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship.

III.

Yes, the COMELEC has the power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and disqualifications of all elective officials. 

Under the law, the power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following the proclamation.

In this case, the Frivaldo petition questioning Lee’s proclamation was filed only 6 days after the proclamation. Hence, COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the case. 

IV.

No, the proclamation of Lee, the candidate with the second highest number of votes, was not valid.

Under the law, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

In this case, Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Hence, he should be proclaimed and not Lee. 

V.

No, the COMELEC did not exceed in jurisdiction when it issued Resolutions disqualifying him for want of citizenship even if it were rendered beyond the 15-day period as prescribed under Section 78.

The SC ruled that the Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Citizenship shall reckon from the day the official begins to govern or to discharge his functions, that is, upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Quo warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.