Daza v. Singson

TOPICS: Political Question and Justiciable Question; Proportional representation from the political parties to the Commission on Appointments 

FACTS:

Petitioner Daza was a representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments. When the 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the members of LDP increased to 159, while the Liberal Party was left with 17 members. 

In effect, the HoR revised its representation in the Commission on Appointment by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and gave it to Luis Singson from the newly-formed LDP. 

Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the 12 members of the HoR in the Commission on Appointment shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties. 

Daza argued that the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission on Appointment is not based on a permanent political realignment as the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. 

Singson also argued that the question raised was political in nature, that is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Further, Singson argued that the transfer of the 24 members to the LDP was permanent. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the issue is a political question.

II. WON the Constitution contemplates that the members from the Commission on Appointments should come from a political party that has “aged” enough

III. WON the HoR can change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. 

RULING:

I.

No, the issue involves a justiciable question.  

Under the law, a justiciable question is one that involves the legality and not the wisdom of an act complained of. 

In this case, the question involves the manner of filling the Commission on Appointment as prescribed by the Constitution. Assuming arguendo that it was a political question, it is still within the power of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case. 

II.

No. The requirement that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.

The Liberal Party, a faction from the Nacionalista Party, was created in 1945 to support Manuel Roxas’s bid for the Presidency. It was 4 months old then but no question was raised as to its representation in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunal. It was the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

In this case, the LDP has been in existence for more than 1 year. 

Therefore, the Constitution does not contemplate that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence as basis for its representation in the Commission on Appointment. 

III.

Yes, the HoR has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.

It is understood that such changes must be [1] permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or [2] formal disaffiliation and [3] permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. 

The Court would have preferred not to intervene on the matter, leaving it to be settled by the HoR or the Commission on Appointment as the bodies directly involved. 

Therefore, Respondent Singson has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and entitled to assume his seat pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

Political Question is a question of policy or those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. 

The parties invoked the case of Cunanan v. Tan, which provides the following:

In the 1961 election of the HoR, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party; 29 by the Liberal Party; and 1 by an independent. The representation in the Commission on Appointments are as follows: 8 from Nacionalista and 4 from the Liberal Party. 

Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party joined with the Liberal Party under an Allied Majority and installed a new Speaker and reorganized the House. As a result, 3 from the Nacionalista Party in the Commission on Appointments were replaced by 3 of their colleagues who joined the Allied Majority.

Carlos Cunanan, the Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments and instead, designated Jorge Tan, Jr. Cunanan then contended that the rejection of his appointment was void because the Commission on Appointments itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court ruled the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the HoR. The Allied Majority does not suffice to authorize the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments. It was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista Party defectors had not disaffiliated from their party. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. 

US v. Guinto

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit or the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty;  Doctrine of Incorporation; Express Consent is effected only by a statute; Implied consent exists when the government enters into a contract, but distinction has to be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts

FACTS:

The case is a consolidation of cases invoking the doctrine of state immunity. 

GR No. 76607 - petitioners are several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base were sued in connection with the bidding for barbering services. The petitioner filed a motion to dims on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived its nonsuability. 

GR No. 7940 - the defendant is an officer of the US Air Force at John Hay Air Station who was sued for allegedly effecting a dismissal against an employee, a cook in the Main Club, who had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. 

GR No. 80018 - petitioners are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators who arrested Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Cam O’Donnell, for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. 

GR No. 80258 - the plaintiff was allegedly beaten up, handcuffed, and bitten by unleashed dogs of the defendants who invoked immunity from suit

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of state immunity may be invoked in the abovementioned cases.  

RULING:

I. For GR No. 76607

No, the officers of the U.S. Air Force cannot invoke immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered into barbershop concessionaires who, under the terms of their contracts, are required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. Hence, the contracts entered into are commercial and is proprietary act of the US government. 

However, the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Supreme Court. The case was remanded for the respondent court to receive evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.

II. For GR No. 7940

No, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered an employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function such as the establishment of the Main Club. Hence, the US government divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. [However, it was found that the termination of the cook was valid]

Therefore, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

III. For GR No. 80018

Yes, the officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

The doctrine of immunity from suit is applicable to officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

In this case, the petitioners were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts.

Therefore, the officers can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

IV. For GR 80258

The Court cannot decide yet if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Hence, the case was remanded for trial.

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DISCUSSIONS:

A state may not be sued without its consent. 

BASES: 

[1] Express provision in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution

[2] It is a generally accepted principle in the international law

[3] Even if there was no express provision, it is deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations based on the doctrine of incorporation

[4] There can be no legal rights against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.

[5] All states are sovereign equals and cannot asserts jurisdiction over one another. 

APPLICATION:

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state, it is also applicable to complaints filed against the officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

TYPES OF CONSENT:

Express Consent - it is effected only through a duly enacted statute

Implied Consent - it is effected when the government enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government.

Sanders v. Veridiano

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; 

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City, while Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.   

The private respondents are gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. Their employment was converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. The hearing officer ruled for their reinstatement plus backwages. However, Petitioners disagreed with the hearing officer’s report and were allegedly accused of issuing libelous imputations against the private respondents. Hence, they were sued in their personal capacities. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioners may be sued.

RULING:

No.

A government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers. Conversely, a mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.

In this case, the fact that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities does not automatically remove them from the protection of the law. Moreover, Petitioner Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Moreover, Petitioner Moreau was the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Hence, petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government, who acted within the scope of their authority. 

Moreover, a state cannot be sued without its consent. In this case, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners. 

Therefore, the Petitioners cannot be sued as the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts.