When do courts resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of the bill's due enactment?

       TOPICS:

1. Enrolled bill doctrine
2. Congressional journals

Astorga vs. Villegas

FACTS:

Prior to its approval, HB 9266, a bill of local application, went into several amendments in the Senate. During the deliberation in the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities, Senator Roxas recommended that the President Protempore of the Municipal Board, instead of the City Engineer, should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor. Moreover, during the second reading, Senator Tolentino introduced further amendments. 

Eventually, the Tolentino amendments, which were actually approved by the Senate, were not reflected in the bill certified and attested by the Secretary of the HoR, Speaker of the House, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President. 

HB 9266 then became Republic Act 4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."

Senator Tolentino reacted that the President signed the wrong version of the bill. The Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate, invalidated their signatures in the enrolled bill. In effect, the President communicated to the presiding officers of both Houses that he was officially withdrawing his signature. 

Manila Mayor Villegas implemented circulars disregarding the provisions of RA 4065 and recalled actions brought under the authority of the law. Vice-Mayor Astorga objected and sought the application of the law. In addition, when the Mayor was on an official trip, the court enjoined the Vice-Mayor from exercising the powers of an Acting Mayor conferred upon RA 4065. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 4065 took effect. 

RULING: 

No, RA 4065 did not take effect. 

Under the rules on statutory construction, if the attestation is absent, courts may resort to the journals and other records of the Congress for proof of its due enactment. 

In this case, when the Senate President and the Secretary of the Senate withdrew their signatures to the enrolled bill, HB 9266, the Court resorted to the journal of the proceedings of the Congress, which discloses the approval made but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President. 

Thus, when the approval disclosed in the journal was not reflected in the enrolled bill, the bill was deemed to have not been duly enacted and did not become a law. Therefore, RA 4065 did not take effect. 

  

What are the grounds for changing the list of nominees submitted to the COMELEC by a paty-list organization?

      TOPICS:

1. Grounds for changing the order of nominees in the party-list organization.
2. Requisites of a valid IRR  

Lokin, Jr. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), through its President, Joel Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list of their nominees for the 2007 elections. 

As submitted before the COMELEC, CIBAC's nominees are in the following order: Villanueva, Lokin, Cruz-Gonzales, Tugna, and Galang. However, Villanueva sought that COMELEC confirm the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang, and approve the following new nominees in the following order: Villanueva, Cruz-Gonzales, and Borje. 

The COMELEC approved the new nominees by virtue of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804. Section 13 of COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 recognizes the withdrawal of a nominee by the party as one of the exceptions in the general rule that no change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC's Resolution No. 7804 approving CIBAC's petition for withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin and others and its substitution of them with new nominees was valid. 

RULING: 

I. 

No, COMELEC Resolution No. 7804, which approves CIBAC's petition for withdrawal, nomination, and substitution, is not valid. 

The Supreme Court ruled that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress, for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law.

In this case, Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 exclusively enumerates the three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated." However, Section 13 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it added "withdrawal by the party" as a ground for substituting a nominee in a party-list. 

Therefore, the inclusion of withdrawal by the party as among the exceptions exclusively enumerated under the law is invalid. Thus, approval of the petition of CIBAC to withdraw Lokin as one of its nominees is invalid. 

  

Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?

       TOPIC:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?
2. Other benefits (in the statute) vs. Other wage-related benefits (in the admin regulation)

Guagua National Colleges (GNC) vs. Guagua National Colleges (GNC) Faculty Labor Union and Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Unions 

FACTS:

Respondents Guagua National Colleges (GNC) Faculty Labor Union and Non-Teaching and Maintenance Labor Unions demanded GNC that the 70% of the tuition fee incremental proceeds (TIP) should be allocated to the payment of salaries or wages of the faculty and all other employees of the school under Section 182 (b) of the 2010 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools in Basic Education (2010 Revised Manual). 

Petitioner GNC argued that the school management has discretion on the allocation of the 70% of the TIP. Petitioner stressed that RA 6728 is controlling in the manner of the distribution. 

Under Section 5(2) of R.A. 6728, 70% of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel.

However, DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992 provides that the minimum of 70% incremental proceeds shall be added to the salaries/wages/allowances and other wage-related benefits. In effect, the guidelines issued under DECS Order No. 15, series of 1992 on the allocation of the 70% incremental proceeds under RA 6728 restricted the scope of "other benefits" by limiting its applicability to "wage-related benefits," which the law itself does not require. 

The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled in favor of the respondent labor unions. The VA ruled that administrative regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law that they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to great weight and respect. In this case, the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) is the agency tasked to implement RA 6728. Thus, DECS Order No. 15, series of 1992 (Guidelines on the Allocation of the Minimum 70% and 20% Incremental Proceeds Required under RA No. 6728) and subsequently, the 2010 Revised Manual, should prevail. 

The term "other benefits," as used in Section 5 (2) of RA 6728, should be interpreted as "wage-related benefits" or one that is immediately available or may be availed of by the employee while he is still working with the employer. A retirement plan is not a "wage-related benefit," since a Retirement Plan provides benefits to employees upon retirement; it does not provide immediate benefit or relief that may be availed of while the employee is still working. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the VA. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term "other benefits" under RA 6728 should only refer to "wage-related benefits" under DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992. 

RULING: 

No. 

Jurisprudence provides that a law is controlling and cannot be amended by an administrative rule or regulation. Hence, in case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. 

In this case, RA 6728 does not qualify the term "other benefits," contrary to DECS Order No. 15, s. 1992, which limits the increase to "wage-related benefits" only. Thus, the allocation of a portion of the 70% TIP for the employees' retirement plan, which is clearly intended for the benefit of the employees, falls under the category of "other benefits" as provided under the law. 

Therefore, the increase in the retirement plan is permissible under RA 6728. 

  

Which should prevail when conflicts arise between an administrative regulation and a statute?

      TOPIC:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative regulation?
2. What does basic salary mean?

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. De la Serna

FACTS:

Petitioner Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. was allegedly found by the Department of Labor and Employment to have committed an underpayment of the 13th month pay given to its medical representative employees. 

DOLE cited Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of PD 851 or the 13th Month Pay Law, as promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon. Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines, the "commission shall be included in the computation of the 13th month pay".

Petitioner argued that the computation of the 13th month pay which is 1/12 of the basic salary should be based solely on the basic salary not including the commission and other benefits.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law should prevail over P.D. 851. 

RULING: 

No, the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law do not prevail over P.D. 851.

Under the rules on statutory construction, an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.

In this case, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the DOLE Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly added the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851 when it included the commission as part of the basic salary for purposes of computation of the 13th month pay. 

Therefore, the computation for the 13th month pay as provided in the Revised Guidelines is not valid. 

  

What are the requisites for a valid classification under the equal protection clause of the Constitution?

     TOPICS:

1. Requisites of a valid classification; Classification also Applies to Future Conditions

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.”

Petitioner filed a case before the CFI of Leyte against Ormoc City, alleging that the ordinance violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING: 

Yes, the ordinance is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 

Jurisprudence provides that the subject of legislation must be reasonable for it not to be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution, such that it must be based on substantial distinctions; germane to the purpose of the law; the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; and that the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 

In this case, Ordinance No. 4, s. 1964 imposes taxes only on centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The tax ordinance is exclusive to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and does not apply to other identical sugar central which may be established in the future. 

Therefore, the ordinance is violative of equal protection as it applies only to present conditions and does not apply to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present. 

  

What are the tests of a valid ordinance?

     TOPICS:

1. Tests of a valid ordinance
2. Formal requirements - enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU; passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
3. Substantive requirements - conform with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes - due process requirements (procedural - notice & hearing & substantive - lawful means and lawful purpose) & the 6 requisites 

Legaspi vs. City of Cebu

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 authorizing the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions. 

Petitioner Atty. Jaban had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, was impounded for 3 days, and that he was imposed with a fine of 4,200. Petitioner filed in the RTC of Cebu City seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional.

RULING: 

No, the ordinance is not unconstitutional. 

For an ordinance to be constitutional, it must comply with the formal requirements, such that it must be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government units, and it must comply with the substantive requirements, such that it must conform with the limitations under the Constitution.

In this case, Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the corporate powers of the local government units under Section 458 of the LGC, such as the power to regulate traffic on all streets and prohibit encroachments or obstacles. Moreover, Ordinance No. 1664 also conforms with the limitation on due process under the Constitution. While due process requires notice and hearing, the immobilization of illegally parked vehicles without notice falls under its exceptions. Notice is not necessary because the transgressors were not around at the time of the apprehension. 

Therefore, Ordinance No. 1664 is constitutional. 

  

What are the tests of a valid ordinance? What is the principle of Noscitur a Sociis?

    TOPICS:

1. What is the principle of noscitur a sociis? 
2. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a statute and an ordinance?
3. Tests of a valid ordinance

Magtajas vs. Pryce

FACTS:

In 1992, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) leased a portion of a building belonging to the Petitioner for the opening of its casino in Cagayan de Oro City. 

However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City subsequently issued Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the issuance of business permits and cancelling existing permits for the operation of a casino.

The Petitioner assailed the ordinances before the CA, which declared the ordinances invalid. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed ordinances are valid. 

RULING: 

No, the assailed ordinances are not valid. 

A valid ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute. 

In this case, the prohibition on the operation of casino in Cagayan de Oro City under Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 contravenes P.D. 1869, a statute granting the PAGCOR to operate casinos. 

Therefore, the ordinances are not valid.   

General Law vs. Special Law: Which should prevail in case of conflict?

   TOPICS:

1. Which should prevail in case of conflict between a special law and a general law? 
2. What should be the rule in construction in case of doubt in statutes conferring powers to administrative bodies?

Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal

FACTS:

Petitioner Payawal entered into a contract to sell with Respondent Solid Homes, Inc. in 1975 over a subdivision lot in Marikina. Despite being fully paid in 1981, Respondent failed to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the Petitioner. 

Hence, the Petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC Quezon City requesting the Respondent for the delivery of the title or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts they paid. The Respondent, in turn, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, it being vested in the National Housing Authority under PD 957, as amended by PD 1344.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Petitioner and cited BP 129 as the basis of its jurisdiction. BP 129 is a later enactment, promulgated in 1981, as opposed to PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, as promulgated in 1978. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint involving refund or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer. 

RULING: 

No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint involving a refund or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer.

Under the rules of statutory construction, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.

In this case, PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, a special law, should prevail over B.P. 129, a general law.  Although BP 129 is a later general law governing the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, it did not repeal PD 957 as amended by PD 1344, an earlier special law granting the National Housing Authority jurisdiction over refunds or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer. Thus, the jurisdiction of the NHA should be construed as an exception to the general jurisdiction of the RTC.

Therefore, it is the NHA, and not the RTC, that has jurisdiction over refunds or any other claims by a subdivision lot buyer against the developer. 

Contract to Sell; Partial Payments; Reasonable Compensation

  TOPICS:

1. Contract to sell; effects of its cancellation
2. Treatment of partial payments received by the seller in a contract to sell
3. The concept of "full possession"
4. Computation of the reasonable compensation available to the seller for the use of the property by the buyer; prevailing standard in computing reasonable rentals 

 Spouses Rene Luis Godinez and Shemayne Godinez vs. Spouses Andrew Norman and Janet Norman 

FACTS:

In August 2006, Spouses Godinez agreed to sell (in an oral contract) their house in Subic Bay Freeport Zone to Spouses Norman for US $175,000.00.

On August 3, 2006, Spouses Norman paid $10,000 to Spouses Godinez as partial payment. The remaining balance would be paid within 30 days thereafter. After this initial payment, the Spouses Norman moved their furniture and appliances into the house. They also assigned a caretaker to act as a housekeeper. 

Thirty days from the initial payment, Spouses Norman requested an extension of time to pay the remaining balance. However, they only paid $30,000.00 on December 1, 2006.  

Sometime in 2007, Spouses Norman learned that the property had been sold to another buyer. So, Spouses Norman requested the return of their payments from the Spouses Godinez, amounting to $40,000.00. Spouses Norman only possessed the property for about four (4) months.

The RTC ordered the return of the partial payments made by Spouses Norman. The RTC ruled that there was a contract of sale and the $40,000.00 were in the form of an earnest money, which formed part of the purchase price. Absent of any stipulations that the money should be forfeited in favor of the seller in case of any substantial breach, then the partial payments should have been returned to the buyers in a rescission of the contract of sale.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ordering the return of the partial payments made by Spouses Norman. However, the CA found that the contract was not a contract of sale, but a contract to sell. The nonpayment of the obligation to pay the full amount of the purchase price was not a breach of contract, but rather an unfulfilled suspensive condition, which prevented the seller from conveying the title to the buyer. Thus, failure to pay would render the contract to sell ineffective. 

ISSUE:

Whether or not the buyers, Spouses Norman, are entitled to the return of their payments of $40,000.00 made to the seller, Spouses Godinez, in the event of the buyers’ failure to pay the purchase price in a contract to sell.

RULING: 

No, the Spouses Norman are not entitled to the return of the total amount of $40,000.00 used as partial payment to Spouses Godinez in a contract to sell. 

Jurisprudence dictates that partial payments on a failed contract to sell may be retained by the seller as reasonable compensation for use of the property, provided that possession thereof was turned over to the buyers.

In this case, Spouses Godinez turned over the possession to Spouses Norman after the latter made an initial payment of $10,000.00. Spouses Norman even moved their furniture into the house and hired a caretaker to watch over the house. 

Therefore, Spouses Norman are not entitled to the return of the total amount of $40,000.00 partial payment made to Spouses Godinez in a failed contract to sell.

However, in a similar case decided by the Supreme Court, reasonable compensation is the payment of reasonable rentals, which is not meant to punish the illegality of the buyers’ actions, but to compensate the sellers’ inability to enjoy or use their own property. Although there is no definitive legal standard for computing reasonable rentals, the latest jurisprudence provides it to be 13.1% of the property’s total purchase price. 

In this case, the Court noted that the US$40,000.00 amounts to 22.9%, or over a fifth, of the total purchase price of the housing unit of Spouses Godinez, which is not commensurate to the value that Spouses Norman may have derived from their four (4)-month possession of the property. Thus, reasonable compensation may be set at 13.1% of the US$175,000.00 total purchase price, or US$22,925.00. 

Therefore, Spouses Godinez may retain US$22,925.00 of the US$40,000.00 partially paid to them, but must return the remaining US$17,075.00 to Spouses Norman.

*Note: The SC in the Olivarez case (2014) and Gomez case (2000) ruled that the total amount of the partial payments be totally forfeited in favor of the seller, considering that the buyers in these cases took possession of the property for 14 years and 8 years, respectively. 

Full text here. 

Errors in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions; Damnum Absque Injuria

 TOPICS:

1. "Damnum absque injuria” or “damage without injury.” 
2. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. 
3. Fraud or malice should be proven to overcome the legal principle of "damnum absque injuria."

 Ramon Felipe, Sr. vs. Hon. Jose Leuterio, Emma Imperial, and Southern Luzon College 

FACTS:

In 1950, an inter-collegiate oratorical contest was held in Naga City. 8 contestants participated, among them was the respondent, Emma Imperial. There were 5 judges, and Petitioner Ramon Felipe, Sr. was the Chair. 

Imperial received the 2nd prize. Four days later, Imperial filed a protest alleging that one of the judges, Delfin Rodriguez, made a mistake. The Board of Judges refused to amend the results; hence, Imperial filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First Instance).

During the trial, it was proven that Rodriguez made an error in adding Imperial’s scores and that she should have been declared as the 1st placer. However, despite that mistake for Imperial’s scores, Rodriguez also mistakingly added up the score of another contestant, Luis General, Jr. (who was ranked 4th in the final tally), showing his decision to give General an edge over Imperial. 

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court can reverse the decision of the Board of Judges in an inter-collegiate oratorical contest.

RULING: 

No. The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges of an oratorical contest, absent fraud or malice (for that matter, the court would also not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions). 

Under the legal principle of “damnum absque injuria” or “damage without injury,” one may suffer loss or injury, but there is no violation of a legal right.

In this case, Imperial may have suffered some loss or injury, but she cannot assert a violation of her right. Error and wrong do not mean the same thing. "Wrong" as used in the aforesaid legal principle is the deprivation or violation of a right. A contestant has no right to the prize unless and until he or she is declared the winner by the board of judges. No rights to the prizes may be asserted by the contestants, because their's was merely the privilege to compete for the prize, and that privilege did not ripen into a demandable right. 

Moreover, it is an unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and unappealable. However, it would have been settled differently had she proven fraud or malice, and that action should be directed against the individual judge who fraudulently or maliciously injured her. Not against the other judges.

Therefore, the final results of the oratorical contest, as officially announced, were upheld. 

Full text here. 

Second Placer Rule vs. Rule of Succession; Three Classifications of Domicile; Requisites of Domicile by Choice

TOPICS:

1. Second Placer Rule has no legal basis, thus, the Rule on Succession shall govern when a permanent vacancy is created after the winning candidate is disqualified from the office to which he was elected. 
2. The three classifications of domicile are domicile of origin, domicile of choice, and domicile by operation of law. 
3. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; the intention to remain there for an indefinite period of time; and the intention to abandon the old domicile. The last two requisites were not complied with by Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu. 

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu vs. COMELEC, et al. 

FACTS:

Datu Pax Ali Mangudadatu was the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Abdullah Sangki (DAS), Magunidanao, after winning the May 2019 elections. While being a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, Pax Ali filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Provincial Governor of Sultan Kudarat on October 7, 2021. Subsequently, Pax Ali resigned as Mayor of DAS, Maguindanao on November 15, 2021, and won during the May 2022 elections. 

Pax Ali’s opponent, Sharifa Akeel Mangudadatu, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel his COC on the ground that he misrepresented in his COC that he had been residing in Sultan Kudarat for at least one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, when in fact he was still a resident of DAS, Maguindanao, being their municipal mayor. 

Pax Ali argued that his domicile of origin was at Sultan Kudarat. However, he temporarily transferred to DAS, Maguindanao, in compliance with his residency requirement for the position of Mayor. He further argued that despite this, he always had the inherent intention to return to his roots in Sultan Kudarat. 

Both the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc ruled that Pax Ali committed a material misrepresentation as regards his residence in Sultan Kudarat.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC when he ran for the position of Governor in Sultan Kudarat
2. If so, whether or not the second placer rule or the rule of succession will govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat.

RULING: 

I. 

Yes, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

The Local Government Code provides that a governor must be a resident of the province where he intends to be elected for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. 

In this case, Pax Ali stated in his COC that he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for 1 year and 8 months before the May 9, 2022 elections. However, it was only on November 15, 2021, when Pax Ali resigned as the Mayor of DAS. Counting from said date, he has been a resident of Sultan Kudarat for only 5 months and 22 days immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections. This shows that Pax Ali’s resignation as Mayor and acquisition of a new domicile in Sultan Kudarat were done too late.  

Therefore, Pax Ali committed a false misrepresentation in his COC. 

II.

The rule of succession shall govern in determining the new governor of Sultan Kudarat. 

The Local Government Code provides that with respect to vacancies in the Office of the Governor, the Vice Governor shall become the Governor.  A permanent vacancy is created when the winning candidate is not qualified and cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected. 

Therefore, the above concern calls for the application of the rule on succession.

DISCUSSIONS:

Residence, for election purposes, is used synonymously with domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. There are three classifications of domicile: 

1. Domicile of origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; 
2. Domicile of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and
1. In order to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: residence or bodily presence in the new locality; an intention to remain there (not met by Pax Ali); and an intention to abandon the old domicile (not met by Pax Ali).
1. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
3. Domicile by operation of law, which the law attributes to a person, independently of his residence or intention

Apart from Pax Ali's failure to effect a change of domicile from DAS Maguindanao to Sultan Kudarat, one year immediately preceding the May 9, 2022 elections, Pax Ali’s intention to remain in Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao are missing. 

Pax Ali’s intention to maintain a residence in Sultan Kudarat and to abandon DAS, Maguindanao became manifest only when he resigned as Mayor of DAS on November 15, 2021 – a mere afterthought. Clinging to his position as Mayor in DAS Maguindanao when Pax Ali filed his COC as Governor in Sultan Kudarat earlier on October 7, 2021 meant that he must comply with the continuing requirement of remaining a resident of DAS, Maguindanao during his entire tenure. Jurisprudence dictates that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. These qualifications must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure. This renders questionable Pax Ali's bona fide intent to remain at Lutayan, Sultan Kudarat for an indefinite period of time.

Moreover, since Pax Ali failed to show that he had established a new domicile at the time of the filing of his COC, his residency in DAS continues. He remained a resident of DAS, Maguindanao as of October 7, 2021.

The quantum of proof necessary to establish a change in domicile in election cases is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Full text here. 

ALLOCATION OF SEATS FOR PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE PHILIPPINES

The following are the steps to determine the winners under the party-list system in the Philippines. These steps have been updated based on the 1987 Constitution and the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. 

Step 1: The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 

Step 2: The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This is called the Guaranteed Seat. 

• Example: AKBAYAN garnered 2,750,864 votes, representing 6.71% of the total votes cast for the party-list system as of 12:00 AM of May 14, 2025. Having surpassed the 2% threshold, it is entitled to one guaranteed seat in Congress, to be occupied by its first nominee.

Step 3: Those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to Additional Seats in proportion to their total number of votes.

• To determine the additional seats, compute first for the maximum seats reserved under the party-lists, that is, Total No. of Legislative Districts / 0.80 x 0.20 = Maximum Seats
• Example: 254 legislative districts for the May 12, 2025 elections / 0.80 x 0.20 = 63 maximum seats reserved under the party-list system
• After determining the maximum seats, compute for the additional seats, that is, Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party List, in % x Remaining Seats (maximum seats – guaranteed seats) = Additional Seats
• Example: AKBAYAN garnered 2,750,864 votes or 6.71% of the Total Votes for Party List. Therefore, the computation should be 6.71% x (63 maximum seats - 6 guaranteed seats for party-lists who surpassed the 2% threshold as of 12:00 AM of May 14, 2025) = 3.8 additional seats

Step 4: Add the Guaranteed Seats and the whole integer of the Additional Seats. 

• Only the whole integer of the above product of the votes garnered over total votes for party list, in % and of the remaining seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats 
• Example: AKBAYAN's computed 3.8 additional seats entitle it to 3 more congressional representatives, in addition to its 1 guaranteed seat. This brings its total to 4 seats in the House of Representatives for the 20th Congress.
• Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed

Step 5: We apply the Three-Seat Cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

• Example: Although AKBAYAN is projected to earn a total of 4 seats based on the number of votes it received, it can only occupy a maximum of 3 seats in the House of Representatives due to the three-seat cap rule applied to all party-list groups.

For more details, refer to the formula and computations found here: Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives or you may refer to the spreadsheet format for application of the above rules. 

Mother Goose Special School System, Inc. vs. Spouses Samuel Palaganas and Villa Palaganas

TOPICS: Distinction between culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana; Contractual obligation between the school and the student; Negligence 

FACTS

In 2007, Noel, a grade school student of Mother Goose Special School System, Inc., lost his mechanical pencil. He found out that it was Rhys who found his pencil and brought it home. After a few days, Noel asked Rhys to return his pencil, but Rhys failed to bring it, and instead told Noel that he would return it next time. After a while, Mark, who was seated next to Rhys, punched Rhys six times, while Noel also punched Rhys five times.

At the time of the incident, their teacher, Mr. Gerald Gomez, was inside the comfort room. Thus, Rhys reported it to their HEKASI teacher, Mr. Gallardo, who did nothing about the matter. Rhys’s classmates then reported it to their class adviser, who called Noel and Mark. Both pupils admitted to punching Rhys. 

Rhys’s parents, Spouses Palaganas, went to the school to complain. His father, Samuel, requested for an investigation. Unfortunately, the investigation report absolved Mark from bullying, despite his prior admission to their class adviser. After a reinvestigation, the bullying incident was only downplayed by the school as teasing or rough play. Subsequently, the Spouses Palaganas filed a Complaint for Damages against Noel’s father, Mark’s father, the school, and a few teachers. 

The RTC found the School and the teacher-in-charge, Mr. Gomez, solidarily liable to the Spouses Palaganas because the incident happened during class hours. The School and Mr. Gomez were exercising parental authority and had the obligation to protect Rhys from harm. The RTC also mentioned that the school was negligent as it failed to take necessary steps to prevent the punching. 

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, but ruled that Mr. Gomez was not negligent as he was at the comfort room at the time of the incident. The CA also classified the incident as a form of bullying under the Anti-Bullying Act of 2013. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the School may be held liable

RULING

Yes, Mother Goose Special School System, Inc. is liable for breach of its contractual obligation with its student, Rhys. 

Under the rule on contracts, an educational institution has a contractual obligation to provide and maintain a safe learning environment for its students. 

In this case, Rhys, who was enrolled in Mother Goose Special School System, Inc., became a victim of a bullying incident within the school’s premises. Despite the school’s obligation to provide and maintain a safe learning environment for Rhys, its teacher ignored the student’s complaints. The School failed to inform Rhys’s parents about the incident, as they only became aware from the offender’s mother. The School also did not have a protocol for handling the situation, and the investigation only came upon the request of Rhys’s father. Finally, the investigation report was replete with inaccurate information, such as when no disciplinary action was taken against Mark despite his admission that he punched Rhys. 

Therefore, the School is liable for breach of its contractual obligations to Rhys when it failed to provide and maintain a safe learning environment for him. 

DISCUSSION

Distinction between culpa contractual from culpa aquiliana

Culpa Contractual

• Definition: It is the fault or negligence in the performance of a pre-existing obligation. 
• Article: Articles 1170 to 1174 of the Civil Code
• Negligence: Negligence is merely incidental to the performance of a pre-existing contractual obligation 
• Defense: The school should have exercised the required diligence to avoid the happening of incident and to address the incident after it happened. The defense of being a good of a family is not a defense. 
• Presumption: There is a presumption of negligence so long as it can be proved that there was a breach of the contract. 
• Burden: The burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in carrying out the terms of the contract.

Culpa Aquiliana 

• Definition: It is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation (there is no pre-existing obligation)
• Article: Article 2176 of the Civil Code
• Negligence: Negligence is direct, substantive, and independent
• Defense: The defense of a “good father of a family” in the selection and supervision of employees is a complete defense available to employers
• Presumption: There is no presumption of negligence. 
• Burden: It is the burden of the injured party to prove the negligence of the defendant

Application of culpa contractual:

1. There is a pre-existing obligation – When the academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is an established contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The school undertakes to provide the student with an education, while the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations. In particular, the “built-in” obligations of the school are:
1. To provide the students with a conducive atmosphere for learning
2. To ensure that there are no constant threats to the life and limbs of the students
3. To maintain peace and order within the campus. However, this extends to out-of-school premises where the school conducts official activities. Ex.: Cabiao Community Clinic of St. Luke’s College of Medicine in Nueva Ecija - a fire broke out, which resulted in the death of a female medical student, making the school liable.  
2. Negligence – It is the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of the place. In the absence of a stipulated standard of diligence, the diligence of a good father of a family must be observed. It becomes gross negligence when there is a want of even slight care and diligence. Ex: In this case, the School failed to exercise the required diligence to avoid the happening of bullying and to address the incident after it happened. The School has not conducted training or awareness seminars or training to enable its teachers-personnel to cope with the situation. The School lacked the capacity to detect, prevent, and address the bullying incident.  
3. Presumption and Burden - A mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justifies, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Ex.: Far Eastern University failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment when they failed to prove that the guards assigned to the campus met the requirements (qualifications set) in the Security Services Agreement.

Award for Damages

1. Moral damages may be awarded for breach of contract where the Defendant acted in bad faith. 
2. Exemplary damages may be awarded in contracts where the Defendant acted in a wanton, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner, by way of example or correction for the public good. 
3. Attorney’s fees may be awarded when exemplary damages are awarded.
   

Full text here as originally published by the Philippine Supreme Court Public Information Office.

Caltex v. Palomar

FACTS

Caltex (Philippines) Inc. organized a promotional scheme called, “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” wherein participants estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.

A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, accomplish it, and submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Nowhere in the said rules requires any fee to be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate.

Caltex would have to use mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communication. 

However, there is an anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law. So, the Acting Postmaster General declined to grant the requested advance clearance for mailing, and if the contest will be conducted a fraud order will be issued. 

Caltex filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief to declare its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative of the Postal Law and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is covered under the anti-lottery provisions of the Postal Law?

RULING

No, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely dealt with under the provisions of the Postal Law.

The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. Nowhere in the said rules provides for a requirement that any fee should be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. A prospective contestant has but to go to a Caltex station, request for the entry form which is available on demand, and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.

Moreover, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest is not a gift enterprise. 

A gift enterprise is a scheme for the distribution of money or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind. It is commonly applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. 

There is no sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

The term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed.

The appellee, may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof.

Full text here

De Castro v. JBC

FACTS

To fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno on May 17, 2010, the JBC was ordered to conduct with the proceedings for the nomination of candidates; prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; and submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees.

As argued by the OSG, the incumbent President has the power to appoint the next CJ.

Sec. 15, Article VII or the prohibition of the President to appoint 2 months immediately before the election does not cover appointments in the judiciary. 

ISSUE

Whether or not the judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments?

RULING

Yes, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments.

The prohibition against the President or Acting President in making appointments within 2 months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the members of the SC. Had the framers of the Constitution intended to extend the prohibition contained in Sec. 15, Art. VII to the appointment of the members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. 

In this case, the President may appoint any members of the Supreme Court within 2 months before the next presidential elections. It is the imperative duty of the President under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from the occurrence. 

Therefore, the Judiciary is exempted from the ban on midnight appointments. 

Full text here

 

Aytona v. Castillo

FACTS

A day before President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office on December 30, 1961, former President Carlos P. Garcia appointed 350 ad interim appointees. One of whom was Dominador Aytona, who was appointed as the Governor of the Central Bank. 

However, on December 31, 1961, Macapagal issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by Garcia after December 13, 1961 (the date when he was proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, Andres Castillo was appointed by Macapagal as the Governor of the Central Bank.

Aytona was prevented from holding office at the Central Bank. Hence, a petition to disregard the Administrative Order No. 2 was filed in court. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels the midnight or last-minute appointment was valid?

RULING

Yes, Administrative Order No. 2 was valid. 

The administration of Garcia was no more than a caretaker administration after the proclamation of the election of the Macapagal on December 13, 1961. However, filling up of vacancies by Garcia in important positions, if few, with assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment may be permitted.

In this case, the issuance of 350 appointments in one night was regarded as an abuse of Presidential prerogative where the exercise of double care, which was required and expected of Garcia, was hard to believe. 

Therefore, there is no reason to disregard Administrative Order No. 2 which cancels midnight or last-minute appointments. 

Tobias v. Abalos

PRINCIPLES:

• The creation of a separate congressional district is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
• The present limit of 250 members in the HoR is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment.
• It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress (e.g. census) in the enactment of said laws.

FACTS: 

Petitioners as taxpayers assail the constitutionality of RA 7675 converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC. Prior to the enactment, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. 

Petitioners argued that:

1. the law violated the “one subject-one bill” rule as it embraces 2 subjects: 1) conversion of Mandaluyong into a HUC; and 2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into 2 separate districts. 
2. the division of the two districts resulted in the increase in the composition of the HoR contrary to Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution
3. the division was not made pursuant to any census. 

ISSUES:

I) WON RA 7675 violated the “one subject-one bill” rule.

II) WON RA 7675 violated the present limit of 250 members in the HOR

III) WON the absence of the census as a basis in enacting the law rendered RA 7675 unconstitutional.

RULING:

I.

No, RA 7675 did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

The SC held that the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a HUC. 

In this case, RA RA 7675 which is an act converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a HUC necessarily includes and contemplates the subject regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. 

Therefore the law did not violate the “one subject-one bill” rule. 

II.

No, RA 7675 did not violate Article 6, Sec. 5[1] of the Constitution.

Under the Constitution, the HoR shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. 

Hence, the present limit of 250 members is not absolute as the present composition of the Congress may be increased through a legislative enactment such as RA 7675.

Therefore, RA 7675 did not violate the present limit of 250 members in the HoR. 

III.

No, absence of showing the census as a basis in the enactment of the law does not render RA 7675 unconstitutional.

The SC held that the law enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes. It is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by the congress in the enactment of said laws. 

Bengson III v. HRET

PRINCIPLE: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

FACTS: 

Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who enlisted in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship. 

On March 17, 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation. He rand and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. 

Bengson filed a Quo Warranto case with HRET claiming that Cruz is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article 6 [6] of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition. 

ISSUES 

I) WON Cruz can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

RULING

I.

Yes, Cruz was reverted to its natural-born citizenship.

Under the law, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 

In this case, Cruz was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by enlisting himself in the US Marine Corps. Hence, Cruz will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

Therefore, Cruz is considered as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 

DISCUSSION

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this  Constitution; 
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and 
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Two ways of acquiring citizenship: 1) by birth, and 2) by naturalization. 

Three ways of re-acquiring citizenship: 1) by naturalization; 2) by repatriation; and 3) by direct act of Congress.

Two kinds of citizens: 1) natural-born citizens, and 2) naturalized citizen.

• Natural-born citizens are Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
• Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition (governed by CA 473, as amended) and reacquisition (governed by CA 63). 

Repatriation is simply consists of taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. For example: If a naturalized Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino through repatriation or if a natural-born Filipino lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his prior status as a natural-born Filipino through repatriation.

The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. 

Frivaldo v. COMELEC

TOPICS: Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation (as in this case), Philippine Citizenship as an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office

FACTS: 

Juan G. Frivaldo was a former natural-born citizen who became a naturalized American citizen and then applied for repatriation on August 17, 1994 to reacquire his previous Filipino citizenship. He then run for Governor in the province of Sorsogon and obtained the highest number of votes during the May 1995 elections.

Raul S. Lee, the second placer in the canvass, sought for Frivaldo’s disqualification on the grounds that his repatriation was invalid, thus he was not a citizen nor a registered voter; that Frivaldo was barred from running after two disqualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections, and that COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the petition of Frivaldo nullifying his proclamation. 

ISSUES 

I) WON the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal so as to cure his lack of citizenship and to qualify him to be proclaimed and hold the Office of Governor.

II) WON the judicially declared disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon.

III) WON the COMELEC has a jurisdiction over the initiatory petition considering that it is not a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case. 

IV) WON the proclamation of Lee, the candidate the second highest number of votes, valid and legal.

V) WON the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions which prevented Frivaldo to assume the position, considering that they were not rendered within the 15-day period before the election.

RULING

I.

Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid.

Under PD 725, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of the Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. Moreover, PD 725 is a remedial and curative law which seeks to cure the defect in the existing law causing the difficulty of natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire Filipino citizenship. 

In this case, Frivaldo, garnered the highest number of votes in the May 1995 elections for the position of a Governor in Sorsogon.  He applied for a repatriation back in August 17, 1994 and took his oath of allegiance at 2:00 PM on June 30, 1995. Hence, it he should have been proclaimed, not Lee, as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 PM on the said date since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship which is reckoned from the time of his filing. 

Therefore, Frivaldo’s repatriation was valid. 

As regards the arguments of Lee: 

a) That PD 725 or the Immigration Law was repealed through a Memorandum of Pres. Corazon Aquino - The SC ruled that laws are repealed only by subsequent laws. In this case, the Memorandum cannot be regarded as a legislative enactment but as an executive policy addressed by Pres. Aquino to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution might make. In other words, it was left to the first Congress to deal the matter. Hence, PD 725, which Frivaldo sought to reacquire his citizenship, was not repealed. 

b) That the application of Frivaldo for repatriation was filed only on June 29, 1995 and was approved on June 30, 1995 - The SC ruled that the application for repatriation was filed with the OP in Malacañang on August 17, 1994. On June 29, 1995, he was asked to fill out and re-submit the form that the Committee required. Under repatriation, the applicant who was a former natural-born Filipino shall revert to such status.  Hence, Frivaldo who was a natural-born citizen shall revert to such status. 

c) That only Filipino citizens and registered voter can run and be elected to public office - As to citizenship, the SC ruled that although Sec. 39 of the LGC does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Citizenship can be reckoned from the date the official governs the people, the country, or a territory. An official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. In this case, Frivaldo reacquired his citizenship on June 30, 1995, the same day as the term for the Governor began. Hence, he is qualified in the citizenship requirement. As to being a registered voter, the SC ruled that Sec. 39 of the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration, not the actual voting, is the core of the qualification. In this case, Frivaldo is a registered voter of Sorsogon. 

II.

No, the judicially declared disqualifications of Frivaldo for lack of Filipino citizenship does not bar him to run for position.

The SC ruled that the previous disqualifications cannot govern a person’s status with finality as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship. Hence, the disqualifications against Frivaldo in the 1988 and 1992 elections cannot bar him to run again as he may subsequently reacquire his citizenship.

III.

Yes, the COMELEC has the power to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and disqualifications of all elective officials. 

Under the law, the power to annul a proclamation must be done within 10 days following the proclamation.

In this case, the Frivaldo petition questioning Lee’s proclamation was filed only 6 days after the proclamation. Hence, COMELEC acquired jurisdiction over the case. 

IV.

No, the proclamation of Lee, the candidate with the second highest number of votes, was not valid.

Under the law, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. 

In this case, Frivaldo obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections. Hence, he should be proclaimed and not Lee. 

V.

No, the COMELEC did not exceed in jurisdiction when it issued Resolutions disqualifying him for want of citizenship even if it were rendered beyond the 15-day period as prescribed under Section 78.

The SC ruled that the Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections. 

------------------- 

DISCUSSIONS:

Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office. Citizenship shall reckon from the day the official begins to govern or to discharge his functions, that is, upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.

Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

In repatriation, the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship.

Quo warranto can be availed of within 10 days after proclamation of the winning candidate. 

The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.