Spouses Marcelian and Alice Tapayan v. Martinez

PRINCIPLES: 

Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy presented as a documentary evidence, when no objection was raised when it was formally offered;

A clear and convincing evidence is necessary to rebut the conclusive presumption of the due execution of a Deed acknowledged before a notary public.

PARTIES:

Petitioners - Spouses Marcelian and Alice Tapayan

Respondent - Ponceda Martinez 

FACTS 

Respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of land named as Pingol Property in Ozamis City. Two (2) mortgages were contracted over her property:

1. PNB mortgage – P100K in the name of Respondent

2. DBP mortgage – P1M renewable credit line in the name of Petitioners

As agreed, a portion of the DBP loan was utilized to settle the remaining balance of PNB loan amounting to P65,320.55. Subsequently, a Deed of Undertaking among the parties was made.

Based on the Undertaking, the Petitioners shall execute a second mortgage in favor of the Respondent over their Carangan Property in Ozamis City. Moreover, should the Petitioners fail pay the DBP loan and the property of the Respondent is foreclosed and is not redeemed by the Petitioners within 1 year redemption period or in case the loan shall be paid by the Respondent just to save her property from being foreclosed, the Petitioners shall acknowledge as his indebtedness the amount due to the DBP upon foreclosure or the amount paid by the Respondent in paying the loan, but in either case shall be deducted therefrom the amount of P65,320.55 plus interests and fees paid by the Petitioners to the PNB in favor of the Respondent’s remaining balance. 

The DBP loan was not paid when it fell due. 

The Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Petitioners compelling them to constitute a mortgage over their house and lot, the Carangan Property.

The Petitioners claimed that the Undertaking is a falsity. The DBP loan were used as a capital for the construction business of petitioner and Respondent’s son in a Joint Venture. 

Petitioners’ allegations:

1. The copy of the Deed of Undertaking was inadmissible as proof of its contents.

2. The Deed of Undertaking was a falsity.

3. The petitioners are accommodation borrowers; hence they are not liable but the alleged Joint Venture.

4. Should the petitioners execute a mortgage of their Carangan Property, it should be deducted from the amount they paid to PNB mortgage in favor of Respondent. 

RTC Decision:

The RTC decided in favor of Respondent and ordered the Petitioner-spouses to execute a mortgage over their Carangan property in favor of the respondent, unless they reimburse the respondent for the total amount of P1,180,200.10 paid by her to the DBP for the redemption of the mortgage plus P20K attorney’s fees. 

The RTC noted that the Undertaking was acknowledged before Atty. Emmanuel Chiong who enjoys the presumption of having performed his duties regularly. Therefore, the alleged falsity must be rejected as it is valid and binding. 

CA Decision:

Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision to execute a mortgage over their Carangan Property in favor of the respondent. 

RULING

I. The Deed of Undertaking was admissible as proof of its contents

The objection of the petitioners over the admission of the Undertaking should not be granted. 

Under the law, a proper and timely objection over the documentary evidence presented is necessary; otherwise, it is deemed waived.

Although Best Evidence Rule requires that the original documents must be produced whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered. Offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. 

In this case, the Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the RTC, in fact, they only raised this objection for the first time before the CA. 

Therefore, the Deed of Undertaking was admissible.

II. The Deed of Undertaking was genuine and was duly executed.

The contention of the petitioners that the Deed was a falsity is without merit. 

Under the law, a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing.

In this case, the petitioners' denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption. They have not even supported their claim that their signatures thereon were forged.

Therefore, the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the "Bilihan ng Lupa" are upheld.

III. The petitioners were not accommodation borrowers. 

The allegation of the petitioners that they are accommodation borrowers who applied for the DBP Loan for and on behalf of the Joint Venturers, who should assume the liability, based on the Joint Affidavit of the Joint Venturers should be denied. 

The statements in the Joint Venture were only corroborated by the petitioner’s self-serving declarations and the Court finds no other evidence on record to support the existence of the alleged joint venture, and the verbal agreement of the Joint Venturers in respect of the DBP Loan. 

In this case, Petitioners paid the interest on the DBP Loan, insurance premiums, and other incidental fees without seeking reimbursement from the alleged Joint Venturers, establishing Petitioners’ benefit. 

Therefore, Petitioners must bear the liability and comply the obligations imposed by the Deed of Undertaking. 

IV. The amount paid to PNB must be deducted from Petitioners’ total liability in accordance with the provisions of the Deed (the only issue which the SC deviated from the lower courts’ decision).

The Court ordered the petitioners to execute a mortgage over their Carangan Property and such mortgage should only be made to secure the amount of P1,114,879.55 – the amount paid by the Respondent to DBP to avert the foreclosure of the DBP Mortgage. 

Contrary to the P1,180,200.10 amount directed by the lower courts, the SC reasoned that the P65,320.55 should be deducted from Petitioners' total liability, representing the reimbursement they paid to PNB as the remaining balance of the Respondent over the first mortgage. 

People v. Sapla

PRINCIPLES:

• A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

• Probable cause means that there is the existence of facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

• A reasonable search of a bus, while in transit, must observe the following conditions:

1. The manner of the search must be least intrusive 
2. The search must not be discriminatory
3. As to the purpose, it must be confined to ensuring public safety
4. The courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted

• Based on the Exclusionary Rule, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of unreasonable search should be excluded for being a fruit of a poisonous tree

• RATIONALE: To side on the validity of the arrest upon the accused would open floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests, that may be initiated by sly informants. 

FACTS:

The Regional Public Safety Batallion (RPSB) received a text message describing that a person onboard a passenger jeepney would transport marijuana. The police officers organized a checkpoint and flagged down the jeepney. The police officers requested the described passenger, Eric Sapla, to open his sack. It contained 4 bricks of marijuana leaves. The police officer brought it to their office or proper markings. 

Sapla was arrested and charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the possession, control, and custody of marijuana leaves. Sapla denied ownership of the marijuana and asserted that he had no baggage at that time.

RTC Decision: Sapla was convicted of the crime charged with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was accused to pay the fine of P5M. 

CA Decision: CA affirmed the RTC Decision with modifications. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay P1M. The CA ruled that it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle and probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and seizure.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search and seizure. 

RULING:

The SC ordered the immediate release of Eric Sapla. 

I. The Constitutional Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Article 3, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 

Any deviation is strictly construed against the government. 

II. Valid warrantless searches and seizures

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view
3. Search of a moving vehicle
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Customs search
7. Stop and frisk
8. Exigent and emergency circumstances

III. Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-applicability in the Case

The case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle. 

A search of a moving vehicle is only limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. 

People v. Comprado

PROBLEM: 

A confidential informant sent a text message to the authorities as regards an alleged courier of marijuana. The police officers put up a checkpoint and the vehicle was flagged down.

ANSWER: 

It could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle.

In a search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle, which was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items, is the target and not a specific person. 

In this case, the target of the search conducted was the bag of the person matching the description given by the informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus.

Therefore, the search conducted could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. 

THE CASE:

In the instant case, the target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person. 

IV. Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle

People v. Manago

Searching moving vehicles without warrant may entail the setting up of military or police checkpoints. The setting up of checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists. 

GENERAL RULE

The search of moving vehicles must be limited to:

1. where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fairgrounds
2. where the officer simply looks into a vehicle
3. where the officer flashes light therein without opening the car’s doors
4. where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search
5. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to visual search or visual inspection
6. where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area

EXCEPTION

When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 

Probable cause – there is the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 

V. Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not engender probable case on the part of the authorities that warrants an extensive and intrusive search of a moving vehicle

Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Reference Cases

(Label: - invalid warrantless search and seizure; + valid warrantless search and seizure)

A. Aguilar v. Texas -

The search warrant for narcotics in the petitioner’s home based on “reliable information” was invalid. 

To engender a probable cause, an informant’s tip should satisfy the two tests: 1) the informant’s “basis of knowledge” must be revealed and 2) there must be sufficient facts to establish either the informant’s “veracity” or the “reliability” of the informant’s report.  

B. Illinois v. Gates + 

There was a probable cause when the police received an anonymous letter alleging that the respondent was engaged in selling drugs and the car would be loaded with drugs.

 

Based on the totality of circumstances test, a tipped information may engender probable cause when corroborated by independent police work. In this case, the anonymous letter was not the basis alone for the determination of probable cause.  

C. People v. Aminnudin - 

 

Aminnudin was on board a vessel. After an informer pointed Aminnudin to be a carrier of marijuana, the police officers inspected the passenger’s bag loaded with marijuana. 

The Court held that the search and seizure based on a confidential tip was illegal. The Court declared that Aminnudin was not committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. He was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. 

D. People v. Cuizon - 

Pua and Lee were arrested by the police officers based on the tip that the NBI agents purportedly received. 

The Court characterized that the tip received by the authorities from an anonymous informant was a hearsay information that cannot engender probable cause. 

E. People v. Encinada - 

The authorities, based on an informant’s tip, stopped the tricycle occupied by the accused and asked him to alight. The authorities found a package of marijuana inserted between the 2 strapped plastic baby chairs. 

The Court described it as a raw intelligence, which was not enough to justify the warrantless search and seizure. 

The prosecution did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the vehicle. There was no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise. 

F. People v. Aruta - 

Aling Rosa was pointed out by an informant to have carried marijuana leaves in her bag. 

The Court ruled that the search conducted on the accused based solely on the pointing finger of the informant was a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. 

The accused was singled out as the subject. There was no reason whatsoever for the authorities to suspect the accused that she was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. 

G. People v. Coaged + 

Although the police officers received an information from an unidentified civilian informer, the police officers used their senses and observed fats that led to their suspicion. The accused had a reddish eye and walked in a swaying manner. Based on their experience, the actions were indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs. 

The Court held that the police officers should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act, and not merely rely on the information passed on to him or her. 

H. Veridiano v. People - 

The police chanced upon the accused inside the jeepney after receiving an information from a concerned citizen. The police flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The passengers were instructed to raise their t-shirts for possible concealed weapons. A marijuana was recovered from the accused. 

The Court held that the warrantless search was invalid. The accused was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. The police officers had no basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious. 

Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. 

I. People v. Comprado - 

The accused was a passenger carrying his bag inside the jeepney and was apprehended. 

The Court held that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient to incite a genuine reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. There was no over physical act that could be properly attributed to the accused as to arouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. 

There should be a presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken, together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity. 

J. People v. Yanson - 

The police officers received a radio message about a silver gray pickup transporting a marijuana. The vehicle was flagged down at a checkpoint and 2 sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine. 

The Court held that bare suspicion is never enough to warrant probable cause. Probable cause requires the existence of a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 

Search and seizure and arrests should not be exclusively based on the initial tips. It should be progressively heightened by other factors, such as the accused’s failure to produce identifying documents, papers pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of suspicious behavior upon being approached. 

K. People v. Gardon-Mentoy - 

An unidentified informant shared information to the police officers regarding the transportation of drugs o board a shuttle van. The van was flagged down by the authorities and conducted a warrantless search. A marijuana was found. 

The Court ruled that the tip, in the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search. 

L. Saluday v. People + 

A bus inspection at a military checkpoint was conducted. One of the passengers’ bag was lifted and a firearm was revealed inside. The accused had a very suspicious looks. 

The Court ruled that a reasonable search of a bus, while in transit, must observe the following conditions (DIPP was used as basis in the Sapla Case): 

The manner of the search must be least intrusive  

M. THE SAPLA CASE 

The search was extensive reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that he allegedly possessed

The search must not be discriminatory.

The search was directed exclusively towards Sapla. It was discriminatory. In Saluday case, the bags of other passengers were also inspected

As to the purpose, it must be confined to ensuring public safety

No allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At most, the purpose of the search was to apprehend Sapla, based on an anonymous informant. 

The courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted.

The inventory, photographing, and marking of the evience were not immediately conducted after the apprehension at the scene of the incident. 

N. People v. Tangliben +

A person carrying a red bag was acting suspiciously. When requested by the authorities to open the bag, marijuana leaves were found.

The Court held that the police officers did not rest solely on the tipped information. The police officers, using their own personal observation, saw that the accused was acting suspiciously. The overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police engendered great suspicion. 

O. People v. Malmstdedt +

Police officers observed that there was a bulge on the accused’s waist. The police officer then asked accused’s ID papers which he failed to provide. He possessed hashish – a derivative of marijuana. A warrantless arrest was conducted.

The Court held that the probable cause justifying the warrantless search was based on the personal observations of the authorities and not solely on the tipped information. 

P. People v. Tuazon +

The court held that there was a valid warrantless search when the authorities personally saw a gun tucked on the accused’s waist. The accused was not able to produce any pertinent document related to the firearm. The search was conducted upon a visual search of a motor vehicle. The authorities did not solely rely on the confidential information. 

Q. People v. Quebral +

The court held that the warrantless arrest was valid. The police officers did not just rely on the informer’s report about two men and a woman on board a jeep would deliver a shabu. In this case a surveillance operation was made and they personally saw the accused handing out an envelope the accused – included in the drug’s watch list. 

R. People v. Saycon +

The court held that the authorities had probable cause in conducting intrusive search. The probable cause was not engendered solely by the confidential information. There was a prior test-buy conducted to confirm that the accused was engaged in selling drugs.

 

S. Manalili v. CA and People +

There was a valid warrantless search. The police observed that the accused had reddish eyes and waled in a swaying manner. He tried to avoid the policemen and tried to resist. The accused has suspicious actuations. The area was also a haven of drugs. 

T. People v. Solayao +

There was a valid warrantless search and seizure. The man fled after seeing the police. His flight added to the suspicion. In his possession was an unlicensed “homemade firearm.”

U. People v. Lo Ho Wing +

Apart from the anonymous tip, deep penetration agents were recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate. An undercover agent confirmed the plan of the accused. 

Bagista and Maspil Jr. cases were erroneously ruled. In that case, the warrantless search was upheld based on the sole tip given by anonymous informant. 

VI. Absence of Probable Cause in the Case

The police officer did not even endeavor to inquire how the stranger gathered the information. They did not even ascertain in any manner that the stranger was credible. Moreover, the authorities did not even personally receive and examine the anonymous text message. The Phone was not even an official government-issued phone. 

VII. The Inapplicability of the Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless Searches and Seizures

The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest. It requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search (which is not the case)

The search was not a stop and frisk. It refers to searches where the police officers stop a citizen on street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. It is only limited to protective search of outer clothing for weapons. In this case, the police officers went beyond the protective search of outer clothing.

A genuine reason must exist in conducting stop and frisk, such as the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

VIII. Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

In an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizure, the following requisites must be present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and 
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

General Rule: The courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. The fact that the person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission. 

Mere passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent and the presence of a coercive environment negates the claim. In this case, Sapla was surrounded by the police officers. He was subjected to a coercive environment. 

IX. Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure is the inadmissibility of the drug specimen. 

Based on the Exclusionary Rule, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of unreasonable search should be excluded for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.