Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, et al. v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

TOPICS: Environmental laws governing various government agencies; Writ of Continuing Mandamus

FACTS:

Respondents Concern Citizens of Manila Bay filed a complaint against several government agencies for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law. 

The RTC ordered petitioners to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and the CA sustained the RTC Decision. 

The petitioners argued that, under Section 20 of PD 1152, they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations and that the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which is subject to a mandamus. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the Section 20 of PD 1152 relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents 

II. WON the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act that cannot be compelled by mandamus. 

RULING:

I.

No, Section 20 of PD 1152 should be read in complementary with Section 17 of PD 1152 which covers cleaning in general and not to specific pollution incidents only. 

Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters' account. However, the Petitioners cannot invoke and hide behind Section 20.

Section 17 of of PD 1152 or the Environment Code does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Section 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage". This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards". In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

II.

Yes, the cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act that can compelled by a mandamus. 

A writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. The enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature. 

In this case, the Court ruled that the petitioners' obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Therefore, cleaning or rehabilitation of Manila Bay is a ministerial act of the government agencies which is subject to a mandamus.

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DISCUSSIONS:

Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus," the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.

Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. In the case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed to the men and women representing the future generations of Filipinos.

[1] Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA)

RA 7924 or the law creating the MMDA

• Section 3 - provides for the waste disposal services of MMDA. 

RA 9003 (Ecological Solid Waste Management Act)

• Section 41 - prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills
• Section 42 - provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill.
• Section 36 and 37 - enjoining MMDA and LGUs, among others, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, 5 years after effectivity of RA 9003, the use of controlled dumps. 
• Section 48, Chapter VI - (prohibited acts - dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or nonbiodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate.

PD 1152 (Philippine Environmental Code) outlines MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal. 

RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992)

• Section 28 - the MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, may cause the eviction or demolition of persons or entities who occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds.

[2] Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

EO 192 - DENR is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

Section 19 - designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for the enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. It also confers the DENR a jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution and to determine its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. It also instructed DENR to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas

[3] Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA)

PD 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973)- grants LWUA the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water.

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)- the LWUA, as attached agency of DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the county.   

[4] Department of Agriculture (DA)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) - DA is tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. 

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) - DA, in coordination with LGUs and other concerned sectors, is in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis. 

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

• Sectin 22 [c] - The BFAR shall be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. 

[5] Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)- DPWH is tasked to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications.

[6] Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)

PD 601 (Revised Cost Guard Law of 1974)

• Section 5  and Section 6 - PCG shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. 

[7] Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) - PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. 

• Section 86 - the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions.

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998)

• Sec. 124 - both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.

[8] Philippine Port Authority (PPA)

EO 513  

• Section 2 - PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development."
• Sec. 6-c - PPA has the police authority within the ports administered by it to carry out its powers and functions, without prejudice to the functions of the Bureau of Customs. It has the power to regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port or watercraft

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78 - the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, PPA is tasked to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels. 

[9] Department of Health (DOH)

PD 1067 (Water Code)

• Article 76 - DOH is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use.
• Article 51 - (though not the task of DOH, but under the same law) - it is prohibited to build structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways: The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind . 

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004)

• Section 8 - DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system.

PD 856 (Code of Sanitation of the Philippines)

• Section 72 and Section 5.1.1 of Chapter XVII - the DOH is ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

[10] Department of Education (DepEd)

PD 1152 (Philippine Environmental Code) - DepEd is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.

RA 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998)

• Section 118 - the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, CHED, and PIA, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment.

[11] Department of Budget and Management (DBM)

EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)

• Section 2 - DBM should ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the country's development objectives.

RA 9275 (Clean Water Act of 2004) - the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

Daza v. Singson

TOPICS: Political Question and Justiciable Question; Proportional representation from the political parties to the Commission on Appointments 

FACTS:

Petitioner Daza was a representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission on Appointments. When the 24 members of the Liberal Party resigned and joined the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), the members of LDP increased to 159, while the Liberal Party was left with 17 members. 

In effect, the HoR revised its representation in the Commission on Appointment by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and gave it to Luis Singson from the newly-formed LDP. 

Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the 12 members of the HoR in the Commission on Appointment shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties. 

Daza argued that the reorganization of the House representation in the Commission on Appointment is not based on a permanent political realignment as the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability. 

Singson also argued that the question raised was political in nature, that is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Further, Singson argued that the transfer of the 24 members to the LDP was permanent. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the issue is a political question.

II. WON the Constitution contemplates that the members from the Commission on Appointments should come from a political party that has “aged” enough

III. WON the HoR can change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. 

RULING:

I.

No, the issue involves a justiciable question.  

Under the law, a justiciable question is one that involves the legality and not the wisdom of an act complained of. 

In this case, the question involves the manner of filling the Commission on Appointment as prescribed by the Constitution. Assuming arguendo that it was a political question, it is still within the power of review of the Court under the expanded jurisdiction in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Therefore, the SC acquires jurisdiction over the case. 

II.

No. The requirement that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not acceptable.

The Liberal Party, a faction from the Nacionalista Party, was created in 1945 to support Manuel Roxas’s bid for the Presidency. It was 4 months old then but no question was raised as to its representation in the Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunal. It was the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.

In this case, the LDP has been in existence for more than 1 year. 

Therefore, the Constitution does not contemplate that a political party should pass the test of time to prove its permanence as basis for its representation in the Commission on Appointment. 

III.

Yes, the HoR has the authority to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership.

It is understood that such changes must be [1] permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or [2] formal disaffiliation and [3] permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another. 

The Court would have preferred not to intervene on the matter, leaving it to be settled by the HoR or the Commission on Appointment as the bodies directly involved. 

Therefore, Respondent Singson has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and entitled to assume his seat pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. 

------------------------- 

DISCUSSIONS:

Political Question is a question of policy or those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. 

The parties invoked the case of Cunanan v. Tan, which provides the following:

In the 1961 election of the HoR, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party; 29 by the Liberal Party; and 1 by an independent. The representation in the Commission on Appointments are as follows: 8 from Nacionalista and 4 from the Liberal Party. 

Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party joined with the Liberal Party under an Allied Majority and installed a new Speaker and reorganized the House. As a result, 3 from the Nacionalista Party in the Commission on Appointments were replaced by 3 of their colleagues who joined the Allied Majority.

Carlos Cunanan, the Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments and instead, designated Jorge Tan, Jr. Cunanan then contended that the rejection of his appointment was void because the Commission on Appointments itself was invalidly constituted.

The Court ruled the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the HoR. The Allied Majority does not suffice to authorize the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments. It was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista Party defectors had not disaffiliated from their party. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. 

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs

TOPIC: If a non-governmental function or proprietary act is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity.

FACTS:

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case of rotary drill parts amounting to over 18K. 

The lower court dismissed the complaint as neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. 

The Plaintiff argued that not all government entities are immune from suit especially when government entities are discharging proprietary functions such as engaging in arrastre service.  

ISSUE:

WON the Customs Arrastre Service of the Bureau of Customs is immune from suit.

RULING:

Yes. 

If a proprietary function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. 

In this case, the Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance. Its primary function is governmental, that is, assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties. The arrastre function may be deemed proprietary, but it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bureau of Customs. Hence, engaging in the arraste service does not necessarily render said Bureau liable to suit.

Therefore, the Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

------------------------ 

DISCUSSION:

Why is arrastre service deemed as an incident to the governmental function of the Bureau of Customs?

For practical reasons said revenues and customs duties can not be assessed and collected by simply receiving the importer's or ship agent's or consignee's declaration of merchandise being imported and imposing the duty provided in the Tariff law. Customs authorities and officers must see to it that the declaration tallies with the merchandise actually landed. And this checking up requires that the landed merchandise be hauled from the ship's side to a suitable place in the customs premises to enable said customs officers to make it, that is, it requires arrastre operation.

What should be done by the Plaintiff?

Plaintiff should have filed its present claim with the General Auditing Office, it being for money, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327, which state the conditions under which money claims against the Government may be filed.

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands

TOPIC: An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability unless it is clearly expressed in the act. 

FACTS:

Plaintiff Meritt figured out a collision against the ambulance of the General Hospital which made him severely injured. He was awarded the amount of P14,741. 

The plaintiff requested to increase the amount of damages as he was wholly incapacitated for six months. It was an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.

Under Act. No. 2457, it was acknowledged that the claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital. 

ISSUE:

WON the act also concedes the states liability to the plaintiff.

RULING:

No.

An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability. The state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. 

Act. No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. In reference to Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of the state is limited only to acts through a special agent. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Therefore, the plaintiff cannot hold the state liable absence of an express legislative enactment appropriating sufficient funds therefor. [The matter rests solely with the legislature and not with the courts].

Republic v. Feliciano

TOPICS: Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body; Waiver of immunity should be strictly construed against the state. 

FACTS:

Feliciano filed a complaint against the Republic for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcels of land which were reserved for settlement purposes under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) per Proclamation No. 90.

The intervenors filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic cannot be sued without its consent 

ISSUE:

WON the government has waived its immunity from suit.  

RULING:

No.

Waiver of state immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris.

In this case, Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. A Proclamation is not a legislative act. Hence, the state has not given its consent to be sued. 

Therefore, there was no consent given by the state for it be liable. [the complaint was dismissed as the possessory information under the Spanish Mortgage Law he presented cannot establish proof of ownership or exclusion of the land in the NARRA].

Republic v. Sandoval

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; A suit against the state is proper when the [1] republic is sued by name, [2] the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and [3] when the suit is on its face against the government officer but the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government. 

FACTS:

The heirs of the deceased during the Mendiola Massacre on January 22, 1987 filed a case for damages against the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers and personnel involved in the incident. 

The petitioners argued that the State waived its immunity from suit on the basis of the report issued by the Citizens’ Mendiola Commission organized by Pres. Aquino. 

The Commission recommended the government to indemnify the heirs and the victims of the Mendiola incident. 

ISSUE:

WON the case qualifies as a suit against the state. 

RULING:

No, the case is not a suit against the state.

A suit against the state is proper when the Republic is sued by name, the suit is against an unincorporated government agency, and that the ultimate liability belongs to the government. 

In this case, the military officers and personnel exceeded their authority in the discharge of their official functions. They Committee report found that there was a lack of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms and there were unnecessary firing. Hence, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government

Therefore, the case does not qualify as a suit against the estate. [the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court]

-------------- 

DISCUSSION:

The report of the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. The findings only serve as the cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate his/her claim. The Commission, being a fact-finding body, is merely a preliminary venue. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory.

US v. Guinto

TOPICS: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit or the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty;  Doctrine of Incorporation; Express Consent is effected only by a statute; Implied consent exists when the government enters into a contract, but distinction has to be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts

FACTS:

The case is a consolidation of cases invoking the doctrine of state immunity. 

GR No. 76607 - petitioners are several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base were sued in connection with the bidding for barbering services. The petitioner filed a motion to dims on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived its nonsuability. 

GR No. 7940 - the defendant is an officer of the US Air Force at John Hay Air Station who was sued for allegedly effecting a dismissal against an employee, a cook in the Main Club, who had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. 

GR No. 80018 - petitioners are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators who arrested Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Cam O’Donnell, for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act. 

GR No. 80258 - the plaintiff was allegedly beaten up, handcuffed, and bitten by unleashed dogs of the defendants who invoked immunity from suit

ISSUE:

WON the doctrine of state immunity may be invoked in the abovementioned cases.  

RULING:

I. For GR No. 76607

No, the officers of the U.S. Air Force cannot invoke immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered into barbershop concessionaires who, under the terms of their contracts, are required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas. Hence, the contracts entered into are commercial and is proprietary act of the US government. 

However, the evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is not before the Supreme Court. The case was remanded for the respondent court to receive evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.

II. For GR No. 7940

No, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

A state may be sued through its implied consent, such as when the state enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government. 

In this case, the US government entered an employment contract with the cook in the discharge of its proprietary function such as the establishment of the Main Club. Hence, the US government divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. [However, it was found that the termination of the cook was valid]

Therefore, the officer of the US Air Force cannot invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

III. For GR No. 80018

Yes, the officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of the Special Investigators can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

The doctrine of immunity from suit is applicable to officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.

In this case, the petitioners were charged precisely with the function of preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty of such acts.

Therefore, the officers can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit. 

IV. For GR 80258

The Court cannot decide yet if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. Hence, the case was remanded for trial.

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DISCUSSIONS:

A state may not be sued without its consent. 

BASES: 

[1] Express provision in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution

[2] It is a generally accepted principle in the international law

[3] Even if there was no express provision, it is deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations based on the doctrine of incorporation

[4] There can be no legal rights against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends.

[5] All states are sovereign equals and cannot asserts jurisdiction over one another. 

APPLICATION:

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state, it is also applicable to complaints filed against the officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

TYPES OF CONSENT:

Express Consent - it is effected only through a duly enacted statute

Implied Consent - it is effected when the government enters a contract involving proprietary acts of the government.

Sanders v. Veridiano

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit; 

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olongapo City, while Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base.   

The private respondents are gameroom attendants in the special services department of NAVSTA. Their employment was converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. The hearing officer ruled for their reinstatement plus backwages. However, Petitioners disagreed with the hearing officer’s report and were allegedly accused of issuing libelous imputations against the private respondents. Hence, they were sued in their personal capacities. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioners may be sued.

RULING:

No.

A government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers. Conversely, a mere invocation of official character will not suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.

In this case, the fact that the petitioners were sued in their personal capacities does not automatically remove them from the protection of the law. Moreover, Petitioner Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents. Moreover, Petitioner Moreau was the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the special services department of NAVSTA. Hence, petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United States government, who acted within the scope of their authority. 

Moreover, a state cannot be sued without its consent. In this case, the government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners. 

Therefore, the Petitioners cannot be sued as the United States government has not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts. 

Festejo v. Fernando

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Petitioner Festejo accused the Defendant Director of Public Works for constructing an irrigation canal on her 3 parcels of land. 

ISSUE:

WON the Defendant may be sued being the Director of Public Works

RULING:

I.

Yes.

Under the law, officer or employee may be sued as any other citizen if an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred on him by law. 

In this case, the Director of Public Works went outside the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and usefulness. Hence, the Director of Public Works must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed on him by law.

Therefore, the Defendant may be sued.

USA v. Reyes

TOPIC: Doctrine of Immunity from Suit

FACTS:

Respondent Montoya is an American citizen working as the ID checker at the US Navy Exchange at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (NEX JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner Bradford, also an American citizen, was the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters. 

The Respondent filed a complaint concerning the alleged discriminatory acts committed by the petitioner in excess of her authority as the store manager of the NEX JUSMAG. 

The Petitioner, together with the US Government, filed a Motion to Dismiss as the case was a suit against the USA, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent. The respondent argued that the complained act was conducted at the parking lot, outside the JUSMAG Store and that Petitioner does not possess diplomatic immunity. 

ISSUE:

WON the Petitioner possesses diplomatic immunity.

RULING:

I.

No.   

Under the doctrine of immunity from suit, a state may not be sued without its consent. The immunity applies against officials of states for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties. However, unauthorized acts of government officials or where public officials are being sued in their private and personal capacity are not suit against the state. 

In this case, Petitioner Bradford was sued in her private or personal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place of official functions. Petitioner’s illegal search on the Respondent’s person and belongings was conducted outside the JUSMAG premises. 

Therefore, Petitioner, who was sued for the unauthorized act outside of the scope of her authority and was sued in her personal capacity cannot enjoy of the immunity from suit. 

-------------------------------- 

DISCUSSION:

General Rule: A state may not be sued without its consent. It is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 

Exception: [1] Unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State and [2] where public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. Thus, they are not a suit against the state. 

The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Basis: Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution and the generally accepted principles of international law. 

Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.

Sanidad v. COMELEC

TOPICS:  legal standing, jusiticiable and political question, referendum and plebiscite

FACTS:

Petitioners Sanidad sought to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16, 1976 per PD 1031 and to declare without effect PD 991, PD 1033.

Presidential Decree No. 991 - calls for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies to resolve the issues of Martial law, the Interim Assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period for its existence, and the length of period for the exercise by the President.

Presidential Decree No. 1033 - it provides the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum plebiscite: 1) Do you want martial law to be continued? 2) WON you want ML to be continued, do you approve the ff. amendments of the Consti? a) in lieu of the interim National Assembly, there shall be an interim Batasang Pambasna composed of the President and representatives and those chosen members of the Cabinet. 

Moreover, petitioners contend that there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. 

ISSUE:

I) WON the petitioners have the legal standing to challenge the PDs

II) WON the issue involves a political question

RULING:

I.

Yes, the petitioners have legal standing as taxpayers. They have an interest over the lawful expenditure of the funds appropriated in the PDs. In this case, PD 1031 appropriates 8M, while PD 991 appropriates 5M.  

II.

No, the issue is a justiciable question. 

Under the 1973 Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. 

In this case, the validity of PD 1031, 991, and 1033 are assailed as invalid. Thus, the issue of the validity of the decrees is plainly justiciable. More so that the judiciary is the interpreter of the Constitution whether the procedure is followed in amending the Constitution or the authority assumed by the President to propose amendments was valid or not. 

Therefore, the question was justiciable which can be passed upon the court.

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DISCUSSION:

There are two periods in the constitutional life of the nation:

1) Period of Normalcy

2) Period of Transition

In the period of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposal of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.

The calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. 

In the period of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister.

The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. 

In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly.

A "referendum" is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President. It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts. 

A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election."

Political questions are associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular fact. 

Occena v. COMELEC

TOPICS: 1973 Constitution is the Fundamental Law, The 1973 Constitution vested the Interim Batasang Pambansa with the power to propose amendments upon a special call by the PM by a vote of the majority of its members, Doctrine of Proper Submission, 

FACTS:

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon Gonzales, as taxpayers, challenged the validity of the 3 Batasang Pambansa Resolutions as follows:

1) Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5;

2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and

3) Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention

The petitioners questioned the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose the amendments being so extensive in character that they go beyond the limits of the authority conferred on them. The petitioners also a question on whether the people were properly informed on the amendments. 

ISSUE:

I. WON the power of the Interim BP to propose amendment was constitutional.

II. WON the proposed amendments overhaul the Constitution that it tantamount to a revision.

III. WON the change in the Constitution followed the requisite standard for a proper submission.

RULING:

I.

Yes, the 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 

II.

No, the issue on whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution is of no moment because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Moreover, amendment includes revision. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.

III.

Yes, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.

In this case, the three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Moreover, the people were adequately informed and it cannot be denied that the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media”. Hence, it cannot, therefore, be said that the people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments.

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DISCUSSION:

MAJORITY VOTE NEEDED TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS: The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

Bayan v. Zamora

TOPICS: Power of the President to enter into a treaty/international agreement, Concurring power of the Senate, VFA, pacta sunt servanda,

FACTS: 

On October 5, 1998, President Estrada ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement. The following day, Pres. Estrada officially transmitted to the Senate the instrument of ratification, the letter of the Pres., and the VFA for their concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 

On May 27, 1999, the Senate, by a vote of 2/3, concurred the ratification of the Pres. On June 1, 1999, the VFA was officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which the US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. 

The petitioners assailed the Constitutionality of the VFA on the basis of transcendental importance, that Section 25 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable and not Section 21 of Article of VII,  

ISSUE: 

I) WON the petitioner have legal standing as citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA.

II) WON VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution

III) WON the conditions under Section 25 are complied 

RULING

I.

No, the petitioner have no legal standing as citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA.

A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law has to show that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement. In this case, the petitioner failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. 

Moreover, a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. In this case,  the petitioners failed to allege that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended. 

As legislators, legal standing may be maintained if there is a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong. In this case, the legislators failed to show direct injury. Moreover, the IBP lacks legal capacity in the absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing the National President to commence the action.

II.

Both Section 21, Article VII and Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution are applicable and are not contradicting provisions.

Under the rules on statutory construction, where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the particular enactment.

In this case, the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate which is provided under the general requirement of Article 21 is only one of the requisites under specific mandates in Section 25. Hence, Section 25 must be construed in related to the provisions of Section 21. 

III

Yes, the conditions under Section 25, Article XVIII are complied.

Section 25 of Article XVIII, disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

On the first condition: The Visiting Forces Agreement is the treaty. A treaty is an international instrument concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation. The other terms used for a treaty or international agreement are: act, protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes, pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi.

On the second condition: The treaty was duly concurred in by the Senate. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23) incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, will not alter in any significant way the circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). The provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.

On the third condition: The VFA was recognized as a treaty by the United States of America. Being recognized as a treaty means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. It inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement, without Senate approval, because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. 

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DISCUSSIONS:

The 1987 Constitution provides two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. 

Section 21, Article VII provides that, “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."

Section 25, Article XVIII provides that, "After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except [1] under a treaty duly [2] concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and [3] recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."

Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its representative, or was expressed during the negotiation.

Effect of Ratification: The treaty becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith. 

Only the President has the Power to Enter into Treaties and International Agreements: As regards, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.

Treaty Concurring Power of the Senate: The role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement. Whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act.

Laurel v. Misa

TOPICS: Permanent allegiance; Subsistence of sovereignty and not transferred to the occupant; Military Occupant cannot suspend treason; Rights of the Government to Prosecute Treason committed during the Japanese Occupation

FACTS: 

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus based on his theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese Occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reasons that:

1) the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens was suspended; 2) there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic. 

ISSUE: 

I) WON the crime on treason was suspended during the Japanese Occupation

II) WON the change in the sovereignty from the Commonwealth to Republic affects the prosecution of the crime of treason.

RULING

I.

No, inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their absolute allegiance to the latter during the enemy occupation. 

The sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. Hence, the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation. 

The preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason.

Therefore, the petition for habeas corpus was denied. Treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people.

II.

No, the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people.

Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that the government established by the Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines.

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DISCUSSIONS:

Nature of Allegiance: The citizen or subject owes absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign. 

Effect of Enemy Occupation: The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier.

Effect on Sovereignty of the Legitimate Government during Enemy Occupation: The sovereignty of the legitimate government subsists in a territory occupied by the military forces during a war, although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy.

Temporary Allegiance of the Inhabitants of the Territory Occupied to the Military Government: The relation of the inhabitants of the territory occupied toward the military government may be considered similar to the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign.

Treason in a Territory under the Military Occupation: Citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort. The inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the legitimate government during the enemy occupation.

Military Occupants has the Power to Change Laws or Make New Ones: Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the 1) Hague Regulations, 2) the usages established by civilized nations, 3) the laws of humanity and the 4) requirements of public conscience.

Military Occupant Cannot Repeal or Suspend the Operation of Law of Treason: Since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason. The operation of treason is essential for the preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government.  

Effect of Suspended Allegiance: It would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty —such theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit a political suicide.

Sovereignty Resides in the People of the Philippines

The Question of Sovereignty is a Political Question: The question of sovereignty is "a purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officer, citizens and subjects of the country.”

Right of the Philippine Republic to Prosecute Treason committed during the Japanese Occupation: Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of our Constitution provides that: "The government established by this Constitution shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine Independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the Republic of the Philippines."